The U.S. strategic flexibility policy prospects for the U.S.-ROK alliance by Oh, Soonkun
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-12
The U.S. strategic flexibility policy prospects for the
U.S.-ROK alliance
Oh, Soonkun













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THE U.S. STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY POLICY: 








 Thesis Co-Advisors:   Edward A. Olsen 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE : The U.S. Strategic Flexibility Policy: Prospects for 
the U.S.-ROK Alliance 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Soonkun Oh 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER    
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
   AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The U.S.-ROK alliance has been a vital element for South Korea’s security since the end of the Korean War.  By 
successfully serving its primary role in deterring a North Korean reinvasion of the South, the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) was the 
core within the alliance.  Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, it began to transform the structure of 
U.S. forces overseas under the Military Transformation plan.  In this context, the USFK is undergoing an unprecedented 
transformation process.  With the United States and South Korea’s recent agreement on the strategic flexibility of USFK, it became 
obvious that the primary role of the USFK will be changed from North Korean deterrence to a regional contingency force.  This 
thesis assesses the implications of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy for South Korean security.  It discusses how the U.S. 
strategic flexibility will influence the security circumstances surrounding the Korean peninsula and how it could change the U.S.-
ROK alliance.  The U.S.-Japan alliance transformation and the realignment of USFJ is assessed as a case study.  Finally, based on 
the four criteria which are determined as the essential elements in South Korean security, South Korea’s policy options toward the 
U.S. strategic flexibility policy are assessed. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
135 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  U.S. Strategic Flexibility Policy, U.S.-ROK Alliance, USFK, U.S.-Japan 
Alliance, USFJ, Regional Alliance, Korean Peninsula, South Korea, North Korea, Self-Reliant 
Defense, Force Realignment, Alliance Transformation, South Korea’s Relationship with China and 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE U.S. STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY POLICY:  
PROSPECTS FOR THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE 
 
Soonkun Oh  
Lieutenant, Republic of Korea Navy 
B.A., Republic of Korea Naval Academy, 1997 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
















































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The U.S.-ROK alliance has been a vital element for South Korea’s security since 
the end of the Korean War.  By successfully serving its primary role in deterring a North 
Korean reinvasion of the South, the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) was the core within the 
alliance.  Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, it began to 
transform the structure of U.S. forces overseas under the Military Transformation plan.  
In this context, the USFK is undergoing an unprecedented transformation process.  With 
the United States and South Korea’s recent agreement on the strategic flexibility of 
USFK, it became obvious that the primary role of the USFK will be changed from North 
Korean deterrence to a regional contingency force.  This thesis assesses the implications 
of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy for South Korean security.  It discusses how the 
U.S. strategic flexibility will influence the security circumstances surrounding the Korean 
peninsula and how it could change the U.S.-ROK alliance.  The U.S.-Japan alliance 
transformation and the realignment of USFJ is assessed as a case study.  Finally, based on 
the four criteria which are determined as the essential elements in South Korean security, 
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A. INTRODUCTION  
The United States has greatly influenced Northeast Asia since the end of World 
War II.  For South Korea, it is impossible to talk about the last fifty years of history 
without emphasizing its relationship with the United States.  Since 1953, when the United 
States and South Korea agreed upon the Mutual Defense Treaty, there have been only 
minor changes to the role of the United States Forces in Korea (USFK)1.  The end of the 
Cold War introduced new phases to the relationships among states in this region.  
However, due to the threat of North Korea,2 the United States and Republic of Korea 
(U.S.-ROK) alliance has not changed much and the role of the USFK has also been 
maintained.  In the beginning of the 21st century, the U.S.-ROK alliance encountered a 
major turning point.  An historic Pyungyang summit between two Korean leaders in June 
2000 and persistent efforts of the “Sunshine Policy”3 toward the North during South 
Korea’s Kim Dae-Jung administration rapidly changed the inter-Korean relationship.  
Meanwhile, since the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the United States has 
initiated a defense transformation process and a Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) 
of its forces abroad.  
During 2003-2004, the United States and South Korea began consultations on the 
transformation of USFK under a series of Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) 
talks4 and agreed upon the basic plan of the USFK realignment.  In this context, the 
United States and South Korean governments on January 19, 2006 launched the Strategic 
Consultation for Allied Partnership (SCAP) plan and made an agreement upon “strategic 
                                                 
1 Although the number of U.S. forces in Korea has been consistently reduced since the 1950s, the force 
structure and the role of USFK have not been changed since then. 
2 In 1989, the Nunn-Warner Amendment called for a three phased reduction plan, but it was placed on 
hold after about 3,000 troops were withdrawn, mainly due to the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1992~1994.  
3 For background on Sunshine Policy, see: Chung-In Moon and David I. Steinberg, eds., Kim Dae-
Jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges (Washington, DC and Seoul: 
Georgetown UP and Yonsei UP, 1999). 
4 Details of the FOTA talks will be discussed in Chapter II. 
2 
flexibility.”5  The term “strategic flexibility” first appeared publicly in the 2003 35th U.S.-
ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) Joint Communiqué.  The basic idea of 
strategic flexibility is that it permits the United States to relocate its troops stationed in 
South Korea to other parts of the world where the United States faces conflicts.   
With the decision to reduce USFK by 12,500-men and the overall realignment of 
USFK,6 the agreement of strategic flexibility brought about huge public debates within 
South Korean society.  Many South Koreans disagree with the idea of strategic 
flexibility, simply arguing that it implicates the unnecessary involvement of South Korea 
in a potential conflict between the United States and China.  Moreover, a number of 
South Koreans perceive that the U.S. strategic policy reflects the United States’ 
discomfort on South Korea’s recent anti-American sentiment and difference on North 
Korean policy.  Along with other related problematic issues between the two allies such 
as relocating the Yong-san base, revision of the Status of the Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
and recovering wartime Operational Command and Control (OPCON), the agreement of 
USFK’s strategic flexibility is causing more trouble in the U.S.-ROK alliance.  
B. PURPOSE  
This thesis argues that despite the controversies on the implementation of USFK’s 
strategic flexibility policy, it will eventually play a critical part in the security of South 
Korea as well as in the future U.S.-ROK alliance.  Therefore, the main purpose of the 
thesis is to identify the implications of U.S. strategic flexibility policy for South Korean 
security and analyze South Korea’s policy options toward this U.S. strategic flexibility 
policy.  In this context, examining the development of the strategic flexibility concept 
within U.S. international security policy since the end of the Cold War and a comparative 
case study on current U.S.-Japan force realignment7 will give better understanding of the 
nature of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy and its implications in the region. Moreover, 
through assessing four critical aspects of U.S. strategic flexibility policy regarding South                                                  
5 Launching ministerial level talk regarding strategic flexibility of USFK was agreed upon by the 
presidents of both countries during the Gyung-ju Summit in November 2005. The joint statement was made 
by the U.S. Secretary of State Rice and South Korea Foreign Minister Ban. 
6 In October 2004, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to a phased withdrawal of 12,500 U.S. troops in 
South Korea by end of the 2008. Initially the 3600-man force of the 2nd division in USFK left for Iraq in 
August 2004. 
7 In February 2005, the United States and Japan announced the blueprint of the transforming the U.S.-
Japan alliance including the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan.  
3 
Korean security and defining both countries’ major gaps regarding this issue will not only 
help solve current problems between two old allies but also will allow better insights on 
the future security of South Korea. 
C. IMPORTANCE 
In 2004, trade between the United States and South Korea was over $70 billion, 
ranking South Korea as the 7th largest trading partner to the United States and the United 
States as the 2nd largest to South Korea.8  Furthermore, the two governments recently 
began working on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)9 which would further increase their 
economic cooperation.  Above all, South Korea’s economic success and development of 
democracy in such a short period, after the 36 years of colonial status and three years of 
devastating war, evidently shows the significance of the U.S.-ROK alliance.  The U.S.-
ROK alliance is also well known for its successful contribution to regional security.  It 
served a major role in regional peace and stability for the last fifty years by deterring the 
proliferation of communism and also North Korean reinvasion in the peninsula.  In this 
context, the presence of USFK has been always the core in the alliance.10  
There had been several changes to the USFK since it was established after the 
Korean War.  However, those changes were mostly limited to the reduction in troop 
numbers; the USFK force structure, which was based on deterring the North Korean 
reinvasion, was never changed.  Moreover, since the withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. 7th 
Infantry Division troops in 1971 (based on the Nixon Doctrine), two other total 
withdrawal plans initiated by President Carter in 1977 and by the East Asian Strategy 
Initiative (EASI) in 1990 were both eventually cancelled after the withdrawal of only a 
couple thousand troops. Thus, since its inception as the U.S. forces in Korea and until 
now, the USFK invariably maintained itself as a strong deterrent force toward North 
Korea’s threat to South Korea.   
The current U.S. strategic flexibility policy toward South Korea implies not only 
its troop reduction but also changing the roles and missions of USFK by transforming its 
                                                 
8 CRS Report for Congress, South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, and 
Prospects for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (Washington, DC, 2005).  
9 United States and South Korea began formal negotiations for an FTA in June 2006.  
10 “USFK, economic value $14 billion, and contributes to 1.2% of South Korean GDP (Juhanmigun 
gyunjejeok gachi 140eokbul, hanguk GDP 1.2% giyeo),” Segeilbo, May 20, 2004.  
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overall force structure.  Considering the importance of the USFK in the alliance, the U.S. 
strategic flexibility policy will not only change the role of the USFK but it will 
fundamentally change the alliance itself.  Hence, understanding the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy and its implications are critically significant to the policy makers in 
South Korea and also to the students of U.S.-ROK relations.  Changes within the U.S.-
ROK security alliance are interrelated with the United States and South Korea’s 
respective foreign policies toward the region.  Accordingly, this study gives a better view 
of both countries’ interests in the region, in addition to their relationships with other 
states such as Japan and China.  Additionally, studying the implications of the U.S. 
strategic flexibility policy in South Korea could offer a practical example to the other 
U.S. allies in the context of the United States’ global defense transformation since 
September 11, 2001.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW   
The agreement about a “strategic flexibility”11 concept by the United States and 
South Korea last January brought about large debates12 within South Korean society.  
Many argue that the agreement about strategic flexibility will not benefit South Korea’s 
national interest, which is in the short term deterring a North Korean threat and in the 
long term implanting peace in the peninsula.  But some, including South Korean 
government officials, note that the increased strategic flexibility should be an integral  
 
 
                                                 
11 Literally the strategic flexibility means that the USFK could be used in other purposes by having 
“flexibility” in its capacity rather than just defending South Korean from the invasion of North Korea. 
However, there are much more implications within this policy. Although the term strategic flexibility is 
only specifically applied to the USFK, the concept of strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces was developed 
within a broader context. The strategic flexibility policy basically stems from the U.S. National Security 
Strategy and Global Defense Posture Review which makes up a crucial portion in the Defense 
Transformation. Therefore the U.S. strategic flexibility policy is not only critical in determining the future 
of the U.S.-ROK security alliance but also fundamentally related to the U.S. international security policy. 
More specifics of the “strategic flexibility” will be defined precisely in Chapter II of the thesis.  
12 There are not many current debates among scholars in United States specifically on the USFK’s 
strategic flexibility issue: however, the status and the withdrawal of USFK has been long debated by 
policymakers and scholars in the United States. For recent studies regarding the debates on the U.S. forces 
in Korea, see Ted Carpenter and Doug Bandow, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations 
with North and South Korea (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: 
A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), and 
Edward A. Olsen, “Why Keep U.S. Forces in Korea?,” Far Eastern Economic Review 166, no. 7 (2003): 
22. 
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element of South Korea’s own defense strategy.  Thus there remains a strict division 
between two perspectives in light of how strategic flexibility will affect the security of 
South Korea and also the future of the US-ROK alliance.  
The first group of scholars,13 who argue that strategic flexibility will not benefit 
South Korea’s national interest, points out the three major disadvantages in the strategic 
flexibility of the USFK.  First, they insist that letting the USFK move out from the 
Korean peninsula will weaken its capability to deter North Korea’s threat.  Moreover, 
frequent in-flow and out-flow of the USFK might arouse military tension on the 
peninsula and eventually deteriorate inter-Korean relations.  The second negative aspect 
of the strategic flexibility of USFK comes from the possibilities of unnecessary 
involvement in a potential regional crisis.  Considering recent development of the 
economic relationship with China, South Korea does not want to become entangled in a 
potential Sino-U.S. conflict over the Taiwan Strait issue.  Some even argue that the 
primary target of the strategic flexibility of USFK is China because the global strategic 
goal of the United States is to check and blockade China’s burgeoning economy that can 
potentially challenge the U.S. global hegemony in the 21st century. 14   Lastly, this 
perspective anticipates that in the long term strategic flexibility could increase the U.S. 
military influence in the region and accelerate military asymmetry between the United 
States and other countries in Asia.  Moreover, it is asserted that in the long run strategic 
flexibility could precipitate an arms race in the region.15   
The second group of scholars and also some policy makers16 assess the strategic 
flexibility agreement more positively.  They argue that the U.S. strategic flexibility policy 
is based on the U.S. National Security Strategy and its global defense reorganizing; thus 
as an ally sharing the vision with United States, South Korea should accept the policy and 
                                                 
13 See Jae-Jung Seo, Chul-Kee Lee, Seong-Ryoul Cho and Young-Dae Koh.  
14 Chul-Kee Lee, “Strategic Flexibility of U.S. Forces in Korea,” Nautilus Policy Forum Online, no. 
06-19A (2006). 
15 Jae-Jung Seo, “Strategic Flexibility of USFK and Peace of Northeast Asia,” Korea National 
Strategy Institute Special Report, no. 5 (2005).  
16 See Geun Lee, Sang-Hyun Lee, Kang Choi and Won-Gon Park. Also, some of the U.S. officials 
such as Victor Cha and Evans Revere expressed their views within this side during the conference on 
“Prospects for U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula in the Second Bush Administration” hosted by 
CSIS and Chosunilbo in Washington, DC, May 17-18, 2005.  
6 
cope with it.  Within this context, the strategic flexibility agreement was unavoidable to 
South Korea and to some extent it was a successful diplomatic achievement by 
emphasizing the stipulation “…the U.S. respects the ROK position that it shall not be 
involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people”17 
from the U.S. side.  Also, regarding the out-flow of the USFK, which strategic flexibility 
implies, South Korean government officials and some scholars emphasize that the 
concept of strategic flexibility is a two-way street, allowing forces to come to Korea from 
around the globe as well as being able to leave.  Moreover, it is argued that the strategic 
flexibility of the USFK could serve the current government’s “self-reliant” defense 
policy.  South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun announced “Cooperative Self-reliant 
National Defense”18 at the very beginning of his administration. It is clear that in the near 
future South Korea will take over more USFK roles19 and in this context, this group of 
scholars claims that the strategic flexibility of USFK could positively facilitate South 
Korea’s self-reliant defense capability. 
These two perspectives have both strengths and weaknesses within their 
arguments.  The major strength of the negative perspective is that the anxieties of 
unnecessary involvement and a potential arms race could enable South Korean policy 
makers to contemplate its relationship with not only the United States but also other 
regional players on this issue.  It renders broader views to South Korea by considering the 
ripple effect of strategic flexibility in the region.  The positive perspective also has some 
strength in its argument.  This perspective lies in the argument that the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy will eventually contribute to South Korea’s security and own defense 
strategy.  Considering the strong security relationships between the two countries, as it 
has been during the last fifty years since the Korean War, it is important to note that there 
are mutual benefits within the U.S. strategic flexibility policy.  The gaps between the  
 
                                                  
17 U.S. Department of the State, Joint United States-Republic of Korea Statement on the Launch of the 
Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership (SCAP), January 19, 2006 (Washington, DC). 
18 It appeared first in public during a speech on Liberation Day ceremony in August 2003 by President 
Roh and its basic purpose is to strengthen the role of South Korean military forces to defend the nation.  
19 In FOTA, the United States and South Korea agreed upon South Korean armed forces’ taking over 
the ten major missions of USFK until 2006.  
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policymakers of the two countries can be reduced through the idea that the strategic 
flexibility will not undermine the current security of South Korea but rather enhance it by 
contributing to South Korea’s own defense strategy. 
However, both perspectives also carry some serious weaknesses in their 
arguments. The negative perspective’s main argument is that the strategic flexibility of 
USFK will weaken the deterrence capability of the contemporary U.S.-ROK military 
alliance.  This argument is based on the current reduction and repositioning of the USFK.  
However, reducing and pulling back the U.S. troops from the front line to 75 miles south 
of the line do not automatically mean the reduction of the deterrence to the North Korean 
threat.  According to the U.S. Global Posture Review (GPR), the United States “focus[es] 
on capabilities, not numbers;”20 consequently the U.S. government is currently investing 
$11 billion to upgrade the capabilities of USFK.  Therefore, it can be argued that there is 
less correlation between strategic flexibility and the weakening of the deterrence 
capability of USFK.  
The positive perspective also has a critical weakness in its assumption.  The basic 
proposition of the positive perspective is that strategic flexibility is two-way street, so it 
will not only move U.S. forces out of the peninsula but also effectively bring in them in 
case of contingency in the Korean peninsula.  However, this two-way street concept 
regarding the strategic flexibility is less appealing to South Koreans.  As for South 
Koreans, through the last fifty years of U.S. presence, it was already take for granted that 
the U.S. forces will be rapidly augmented as soon as North Korea attacks the South, 
based on the prepared Korean war-plans.  Therefore, emphasizing the positive elements 
of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy through its increasing reinforcement capability to 
South Korea, does not compensate South Koreans concerns about the U.S. forces 
performing out of peninsula missions. 
E. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
This thesis covers the most debated issues regarding U.S. strategic flexibility: the 
regional role of USFK, controversies on the deterrence capabilities and involvement in 
                                                 
20 “Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture,” Speech by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
Douglas J. Feith. In the CSIS conference, Washington, DC,, December 3, 2003. “…in transforming our 
posture, we are strengthening our commitment to secure our common interests, even in those places where 
we may be reducing forces levels.”  
8 
the Taiwan Strait, and the increased possibility of an arms race in the region.  It is 
necessary to thoroughly examine the implications of these issues for South Korean 
security.  However, it is more important for South Korea to use strategic flexibility to the 
best advantage of USFK’s own security interests.  Current debates on strategic flexibility 
focus mostly on either the negative or positive implications, or fail to explore how it 
could serve South Korea’s security goals; in the short term to deter the North Korean 
threat as well as reduce military tension on the peninsula, and over the long term to 
achieve self-reliant national defense.  Strategic flexibility policy must be evaluated in the 
context of these short and long term purposes.  It is evident that strategic flexibility will 
change the U.S.-ROK alliance in one way or another, and this thesis is thus focusing on 
the ways in which the strategic flexibility policy could change the U.S.-ROK alliance, as 
well as how it can benefit South Korea’s goals within the alliance. 
There are two key questions to be answered in this thesis.  They are: What are the 
implications of U.S. strategic flexibility for South Korean security?  What are South 
Korea’s policy options toward this U.S. policy?  In order to answer these key questions, it 
is necessary to address the following subordinate questions. Answering these subordinate 
questions consequently reveal the answers to the two main questions of the thesis.   
1. What is the U.S. strategic flexibility policy toward South Korea? 
2. How will it influence the Korean peninsula?  
3. How will it influence the Northeast Asian region and South Korea’s 
relationship with regional actors?  
4. What is the gap between the United States and South Korea regarding this 
issue? 
5. What are the main elements to consider in South Korea’s policy options?  
The core argument of the thesis is that the U.S. strategic flexibility policy will 
critically influence South Korea’s security and also will take a crucial role in changing 
the U.S.-ROK alliance.  Therefore it is significant for South Korea to consider its best 
policy option toward the U.S. strategic flexibility policy.  Most importantly, by 
expanding the role of USFK from a peninsula force to a regional force, the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy will pressure the U.S.-ROK alliance to change from the threat-based, 
peninsula-focused alliance to a more comprehensive regional security alliance.  The 
development of the U.S-Japan alliance and the USFJ’s realignment process clearly shows 
9 
the example of a U.S.-led regional security alliance.  In this context, the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy will not only change the status of USFK and the U.S.-ROK alliance, but 
it will also greatly influence inter-Korean relations as well as South Korea’s relationship 
with China and Japan.  As for the regional security environment, it could cause a serious 
arms race between the major players in the region.  
These potential changes should be considered on two levels. Within the peninsula, 
maintaining deterrence capabilities toward North Korea and achieving a self-reliant 
defense capability will be the primary concern to South Korea.  Within the region, 
maintaining good relationships with both China and Japan, and dissuading the potential 
development of an arms race will be also essential.  Therefore, South Korea’s policy 
options toward the U.S. strategic flexibility should carefully consider the following four 
criteria: the U.S.-ROK alliance, inter-Korean relations, self-reliant defense, and South 
Korea’s relationship with China and Japan.   
Considering the above four essential criteria, South Korea’s recommended policy 
toward U.S. strategic flexibility is in the short term to carry out a status quo policy with 
strategic ambiguities, but over the long term to actively pursue supportive policy.  
Therefore, the main conclusion of the thesis is that South Korea must recognize the 
importance of U.S. strategic flexibility for its security, and should actively engage with 
this policy.  In this context, the United States and South Korea must focus on developing 
compatibility between the U.S. strategic flexibility policy and South Korea’s Defense 
Reform plan, which could contribute to both countries’ security interests as well as 
strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
F. METHODOLOGY  
This thesis conducts a case study on the transformation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
21  The U.S.-Japan alliance is the most similar form of alliance to the U.S.-ROK alliance, 
yet it also has many different characteristics.  South Korea and Japan share a common 
“asymmetric” alliance relationship with the United States, with the same mixed feelings 
of “abandonment” and “entrapment.”  During the last fifty years, Japan and South Korea 
                                                 
21 Tokyo and Washington reached final agreement in May 1, 2006 over a plan to reduce the number of 
US troops on Japanese soil by transferring 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam, and relocate a marine 
heliport from Futenma to another part of Okinawa by 2014.  
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were both able to achieve huge economic success and development of democracy under 
the U.S. security umbrella.  However, for the United States, its relationships with South 
Korea and Japan have rather different roles and objectives, as well as different levels of 
priority in its security policies.  Furthermore, it is evident that both alliances are currently 
going in quite different directions under the U.S. military transformation.  Under the 
transformation of USFJ, Japan is further strengthening its security relationship with the 
United States whereas in the same circumstances, South Korea is having difficulties even 
maintaining its previous strong security relationship with the United States.   
In this context, examining Japan’s case serves to be the best instrument to 
understand U.S. strategic flexibility policy toward South Korea.  Considering the 
geopolitical proximity of the two U.S. forces, comparing the USFK’s transformation 
process with USFJ’s gives a better picture of contemporary regional circumstances 
surrounding this issue.  Most of all, in terms of strengthening the alliance relationship 
with the United States, Japan’s reaction to the USFJ realignment and the development of 
agreements on an overall transformation process allows better insights to South Korea’s 
policy options toward the U.S. strategic flexibility policy.  Therefore, this comparative 
case study of the U.S.-Japan alliance transformation focuses on the way in which Japan 
accepted the U.S. military transformation within its particular situation and what the 
implications are for South Korean security and also for the U.S.-ROK alliance.   
In addition, this thesis performs a policy analysis.  Officially, the strategic 
flexibility of USFK is agreed upon between the United States and South Korea.  
Nonetheless, this agreement does not provide specific details regarding this issue.22  In 
this respect, this thesis will offer three policy options based on South Korea’s level of 
acceptance of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy. The policy options will be: 
1. Active support policy 
2. Constraint policy 
3. Status quo with strategic ambiguities 
                                                 
22 The agreement only mentioned that each side ‘respect’ each other’s interests and do not have any 
details on actual implementation or procedures of the USFK’s strategic flexibility. 
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These policy options will be carefully assessed by the four essential criteria which 
are considered as the most critical factors in South Korean security in this thesis. Four 
criteria to test South Korea’s policy options are:  
1. The U.S.-ROK alliance 
2. Inter-Korean relations 
3. Self-reliant national defense 
4. Relationship with China and Japan   
These criteria are selected based on the implications of the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy for South Korean security.  Through these four criteria, the each policy 
option will be thoroughly assessed in favor of South Korean security and the best policy 
option that fulfills the criteria will be recommended.   
G. ORGANIZATION  
In order to conduct the subsequent analysis, it is critical to understand the nature 
of the U.S. policy; thus, Chapter II mainly discusses the contextual meaning of U.S. 
strategic flexibility toward South Korea.  It will start with the development of the 
strategic flexibility concept in U.S. international security policy.  Two of the most 
important documents in recent U.S. national security and its military transformation, 
Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 (QDR 2001) and Global Defense Posture Review 
(GPR), will be reviewed in this context.  After defining strategic flexibility as a core 
concept in the U.S. military transformation since September 11, the development of the 
U.S. strategic flexibility policy in the U.S.-ROK alliance is also discussed.  Finally, this 
chapter examines the actual changes in USFK through the U.S. strategic flexibility policy 
such as reduction in troops, relocating bases, transferring military missions to ROK 
forces and most importantly, changing its role to a regional purpose.   
Shifting to the regional implementation of this U.S. policy change, Chapter III is 
the case study on the transformation of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  Under U.S. military 
transformation and GPR, the U.S. forces in Korea and also in Japan are similarly in the 
process of changing their overall force structure.  After a brief review of the development 
of the U.S.-Japan alliance, this chapter mainly focuses on the transformation of the U.S.-
Japan alliance in light of USFJ’s realignment.  The similarities and differences between 
the changes in the two alliances as well as the U.S. forces are discussed.  Examination of 
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Japan’s reactions to the U.S. military transformation will be helpful in terms of South 
Korea’s policy options to the U.S. strategic flexibility.  Lastly, this chapter explores the 
implications of the U.S.-Japan alliance transformation for South Korea.   
Chapter IV is the core of this thesis.  Based on the definition of the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy explored through Chapter II and the related case explored in Chapter III, 
the actual implications of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy for South Korean security 
will be examined.  Chinese, North Korean and Japanese perspectives on the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy will be noted in order to help understand its implications to the region.  
Then, implications of the four critical aspects in the U.S. strategic flexibility policy are 
examined.  The four aspects are: transforming to a regional alliance; weakening the North 
Korean deterrence; causing South Korea’s involvement in a potential Taiwan Strait 
conflict; and causing an arm race in the region.  Lastly, based on these implications, the 
gaps between the United States and South Korea regarding the U.S. strategic flexibility 
policy are examined.   
Chapter V focuses on South Korea’s policy options toward the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy.  In order to assess the policy options, four criteria are suggested in this 
chapter.  They are: the U.S.-ROK alliance; inter-Korean relations; self-reliant defense; 
and the relationship with China and Japan.  These four criteria are emphasized as the 
most significant factors that must be considered in South Korea’s policy options.  Based 
on the level of accepting the strategic flexibility of USFK, three policy options are 
suggested in this chapter: active support policy; constraint policy; status quo with 
strategic ambiguities.  Each option is assessed with the four criteria and consequently, the 
combination of the active support policy and the status quo is recommended as the South 
Korea’s best policy option toward U.S. strategic flexibility.   
Chapter VI is the conclusion of the thesis.  It briefly summarizes the main 
arguments and the findings of the thesis.  The best way to implement South Korea’s 
recommended policy within the U.S.-ROK alliance is discussed.  Also the further fields 
which should be studied regarding the U.S. strategic flexibility policy on South Korea is 
addressed.   
13 
II. WHAT IS THE U.S. STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY POLICY? 
On January 19, 2006, the United States and South Korean governments launched 
“the Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership (SCAP)” meeting and made an 
agreement with regard to implementing “strategic flexibility.”  The agreement on 
“strategic flexibility” by the United States and South Korea brought about large debates 
within South Korean society and is causing a serious problem between the two half-
century old allies.  Many Koreans argue that the strategic flexibility agreement will not 
benefit South Korea’s national interest which, in the short term, is to deter a North 
Korean threat and, in the long term, to foster peace on the peninsula.  But others, 
including government officials, note that increased strategic flexibility would not reduce 
the deterrence capability of the alliance and should benefit South Korea by enhancing the 
U.S.-ROK alliance.23 
Practically, strategic flexibility means that United States Forces in Korea (USFK) 
may be used for other purposes by having “flexibility” in its strategic employment rather 
than solely defending South Korea from a North Korean invasion.  However, there are 
many more implications embodied within this policy.  Although the term strategic 
flexibility is only specifically applied to the USFK, the concept of strategic flexibility of 
U.S. forces worldwide was developed within a much broader context.  The U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy toward South Korea basically stemmed from the U.S. Quadrennial 
Defense Review 2001 (QDR 2001) and also was specified in the Global Defense Posture 
Review (GPR) in 2003 as well.  Moreover, it was also a crucial part of the U.S. National 
Security Strategy (NSS) in 2002.  
In order to clearly understand the U.S. strategic flexibility policy toward South 
Korea, first it is necessary to explore the concept of “strategic flexibility” in the overall 
U.S. international security policy.  Careful examination of U.S. security and defense 
principles and policies are required in this process.  The strategic flexibility policy mainly 
stems from the QDR 2001 and was specified through the GPR; hence the first part of this 
                                                 
23 The details of the negative and positive aspects of the strategic flexibility will be examined in the 
Chapter IV while analyzing the implications of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy for South Korean 
security.  
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chapter will focus on these two major documents shaping U.S. international security 
policies and defense strategies, especially regarding strategic flexibility.  
After generally defining strategic flexibility as a part of the U.S. international 
security strategy, the latter part of this chapter will delve into the specific details of the 
U.S. strategic flexibility policy toward South Korea.  Development of the U.S. strategic 
flexibility approach will be examined within the change of the U.S.-ROK security 
relationship since the end of the Cold War through the annual meetings and agreements 
between the two countries, such as the SCM, FOTA and, most recently, SCAP where 
strategic flexibility was finally negotiated.  Additionally, details of the USFK realignment, 
such as troop reduction, base relocation, changing force structure, mission transfer and 
also the wartime Operational Command and Control issue will be articulated based on the 
U.S. strategic flexibility policy.  Above all, it is important to note that the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy is dominating the overall USFK realignment process, and thus USFK is 
transforming into multi-purpose regional force.  
A. STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY WITHIN U.S. INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY POLICY   
In the early 1990s the end of the Cold War against communism engendered a 
sense of triumph for the United States and its allies.  The United States became the only 
superpower in the world.  However, the sense of triumph did not last long.  Although the 
main enemy had disappeared, the United States still had to check the emergence of 
potential states that could challenge United States’ regional or global hegemony.  
Moreover, the United States began to realize that in the post-Cold War era, threats from 
nontraditional and unexpected sources could also seriously risk its national security.  The 
U.S. threat perception in response to the New World Order are well expressed in the 
comment from former Clinton administration CIA Director, James Wolsey,: “We have 
slain the dragon but now live in a jungle full of poisonous snakes.”24  The United States 
recognized that it must break off from the Cold War-type fixed threat conception to cope 
with newer flexible and uncertain security threats within the world, and therefore must 
transform its security strategies and force structures in this regard.  
                                                 
24 Paul Rogers, “Jungle of Snakes,” New Internationalist 252, February 1994. 
http://www.newint.org/issue252/endpiece.htm (accessed November 22, 2006). 
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The U.S. Strategic flexibility policy was constructed within the context of this 
“uncertainty” of the global security environment that developed in the wake of the Cold 
War. In this context, uncertainty was the primary driving factor in the new U.S. 
international security policy for the 21st century.  The 2002 U.S. National Security 
Strategy articulated the relationship between uncertainty and the need for flexibility in the 
U.S. forces overseas.  
To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we 
face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond 
Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access 
arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces. Before the 
war in Afghanistan, that area was low on the list of major planning 
contingencies. Yet, in a very short time, we had to operate across the 
length and breadth of that remote nation, using every branch of the armed 
forces. We must prepare for more such deployments by developing assets 
such as advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike capabilities, 
and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces.[emphasis mine]25  
In order to face the security threats coming from future uncertain security environments, 
NSS 2002 clearly shows that the U.S. forces must be transformed into an agile and 
flexible, rapid-deployable expeditionary force with long range strike capabilities.  It is 
evident that throughout the U.S. forces in the world, there will be less need of heavily 
armed Cold War-type fixed forces confronting a single enemy.   
The concept of strategic flexibility was largely conceived in U.S. security policy 
even before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. However, by experiencing the 
unprecedented terrorist attacks in its homeland, the necessity of flexibility in the national 
security strategy was greatly emphasized.  The September 11 attacks truly bolstered the 
notion of uncertainty in the security sphere to both policy makers and the people of the 
United States.26  
                                                 
25 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, 
2002), 29. 
26 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC, 2001), 2. “The 
Quadrennial Defense Review was undertaken during a crucial time of transition to a new era. Even before 
the attack of September 11, 2001, the senior leaders of the Defense Department set out to establish a new 
strategy for America's defense that would embrace uncertainty and contend with surprise, a strategy 
premised on the idea that to be effective abroad, America must be safe at home.” “In important ways, these 
attacks (September 11) confirm the strategic direction and planning principles that resulted from this 
review…the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 will require us to move forward more 
rapidly in these directions, even while we are engaged in the war against terrorism.” 
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During 2000-2003, the contour of the strategic flexibility policy was mostly 
completed within the new doctrines and principles of the U.S. security policies and 
defense strategies that were strongly driven by the first term of the Bush Administration.  
Although the agreement about strategic flexibility was made on January 2006 between 
the United States and South Korea, the strategic flexibility policy was already firmly 
established within the U.S. international security policy during the first four years of the 
current Bush administration.  When the term “strategic flexibility” first appeared in the 
35th U.S.-ROK SCM Joint Communiqué in November 2003, it was not just an 
independent policy toward South Korea and the USFK, but it was already one of the 
primary concepts in the U.S. security policy which shortly after the Communiqué 
appeared as part of the U.S. Global Defense Posture Review.  The rest of this section 
evaluates each of these founding documents to help make clear the origins and intricacies 
of this doctrine. 
1. Strategic Flexibility in the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
2001 and Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) 
In 2001, the QDR was published and made clear that the U.S. strategic flexibility 
policy was widely applied throughout the document. By defining the current security 
environment as “an increasing diversity in the sources and unpredictability of the 
locations of conflict,” the document directly emphasized the necessity for flexibility of 
U.S. forces deployed abroad.  
… Together, these trends produce a geopolitical setting that is increasingly 
complex and unpredictable. Unlike the Cold War period, where the key 
geographic regions of competition were well defined, the current period 
has already imposed demands for U.S. military intervention or activity on 
virtually every continent and against a wide variety of adversaries. The 
United States will not be able to develop its military forces and plans 
solely to confront a specific adversary in a specific geographic area. 
Instead, the United States could be forced to intervene in unexpected 
crises against opponents with a wide range of capabilities. Moreover, 
these interventions may take place in distant regions where urban 
environments, other complex terrain, and varied climatic conditions 
present major operational challenges.[emphasis mine]27  
Although the term “strategic flexibility” was not directly mentioned in the 
document, it was obvious that due to the uncertain security environment, flexibility                                                  
27 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC, 2001), 4. 
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should be a primary element in the new U.S. international security policy.  When it stated 
the U.S. will not focus on specific adversaries in a specific geographic area, it is likely 
that this references North Korea in the Korean peninsula.  Also, the United States’ 
conflict with China in the Taiwan Strait is an obvious example of an unexpected crisis 
against opponents with a wide range of capabilities. In this context, it is evident that the 
USFK should be transformed into an expeditionary force to confront any unexpected 
crisis in the region.   
Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) also clearly represents the strategic 
flexibility concept.  The Bush administration identified Defense Transformation (DT)28 
as a major goal for the Department of Defense (DOD) from the very beginning of the 
administration and, as a result, submitted the “Defense Transformation Act for the 21st 
Century” to Congress in April 2003.  Even before then, the U.S. DOD worked hard to 
refine and implement its plans for defense transformation.  The GPR was considered one 
of the crucial parts of the U.S. Defense Transformation process.29  It is also developed 
from the QDR 2001 and the NSS 2002.  
One of the first official documents regarding GPR was a speech made by Douglas 
J. Feith, the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in December 2003, titled 
“Transforming the United States Global Defense Posture.”30 In this speech, the five key 
themes of changing the U.S. global defense posture were clearly defined:  
 
 
                                                 
28 Three major official documents related to the U.S. Defense transformation are: U.S. DOD, Military 
Transformation: A Strategic Approach (Washington, DC, 2003), U.S. DOD, Transformation Planning 
Guidance (Washington, DC, 2003), and U.S. DOD, Elements of Defense Transformation (Washington, DC, 
2004). 
29 According to Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, enhancing U.S. military global 
posture is one of the major U.S. defense transformation strategies. “The global U.S. military posture must 
be reoriented for a new strategic environment in which U.S. interests are global and new challenges, 
particularly anti-access and area-denial threats, are emerging. The U.S. military is developing and enhanced 
forward deterrent posture through the integration of new combinations of immediately employable forward 
stationed and deployed forces…Over time, this reoriented global posture will render forward forces capable 
of more swiftly defeating an adversary’s military and political objectives with only modest reinforcement.” 
6.  
30 Speech presented to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington, D.C., December 
3, 2003. The statement with similar contents regarding the GPR, was made before the House Armed 
Services Committee by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in June 23, 2004. The five elements are 
introduced as the principles for realignment in this statement.  
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a. Strengthen allied roles 
b. Contend with uncertainty 
c. Focus across regions as well as within them 
d. Develop rapidly deployable capabilities 
e. Focus on capabilities, not numbers. 
It is important to go over these five key elements in GPR because it is also the key 
elements of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy toward South Korea.  First, by 
strengthening allied roles the GPR implies that the U.S. allies should also transform their 
own military strategies and force structures according to the U.S. military transformation.  
Second, the U.S. and allied forces should be transformed to more agile and flexible 
expeditionary forces in order to prepare for the uncertain challenges in the future security 
environment.  Third, during the Cold War the U.S. forces were deployed to counter a 
specific threat in a specific place, but challenges in the post-Cold War era comes from 
unexpected places, not only within the region but more globally.  Therefore, fourth, the 
U.S. forces must possess capabilities to rapidly deploy throughout the region and beyond 
regions.  They should not only focus on the issues from where they are deployed but also 
should have capacity to contend with various other threats in various other places.  Lastly, 
GPR emphasizes that the enhanced capabilities with the RMA could increase overall 
force capabilities without increasing the troop numbers.  Namely, with fewer numbers of 
forward deployed troops, the U.S. force capabilities will possess more enhanced 
capabilities than before.  These five key elements in GPR clearly reflect the key 
characteristics of the U.S. strategic flexibility toward South Korea.31  
On 16 August 2004, President Bush formally announced the new U.S. global 
defense posture to its people and to the world:  
Over the coming decade, we will deploy a more agile and more flexible 
force, which means that more of our troops will be stationed and deployed 
from here at home. We will move some of our troops and capabilities to 
new locations, so they can surge quickly to deal with unexpected threats. 
We'll take advantage of 21st century military technologies to rapidly 
deploy increased combat power. The new plan will help us fight and win 
these wars of the 21st century…. [emphasis mine]    
                                                 
31 Won-Gon Park, “U.S. Military Policy: Transformation, GPR and U.S. Forces in Korea (Migukeu 
gunsajungchaek: byunhwan, GPR mit juhanmigun),” KIDA Weekly Defense Forum 1007 (04-32), August 
9, 2004.  
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In September 2004, the U.S. Department of Defense submitted The Strengthening U.S. 
Defense Posture 32  report to Congress.  The document reiterated President Bush’s 
announcement in August highlighting key aspects of the planned posture changes.  
Further development was made in this document including a detailed region-by-region 
synopsis of the U.S. global defense realignment.  In the document, the Asia-Pacific 
region was highlighted with the following:  
In the Asia-Pacific region, we seek to improve our ability to meet our 
alliance commitments by strengthening our deterrent against threats such 
as that posed by North Korea, while helping our allies strengthen their 
own military capabilities. In this region – in light of the vast distances that 
military forces must traverse in crises – this means increasing our ability 
to project military forces rapidly and at long ranges, both to the region 
and within it. [emphasis mine]33  
Most importantly, for the first time throughout the development of U.S. military 
transformation, this document officially indicated that the changes in USFK are based on 
the U.S. strategic flexibility policy.  The Korean peninsula is discussed separately in the 
document, and the strategic flexibility of USFK is further specified by transforming part 
of the USFK to Stryker units and air expeditionary forces, and relocating current forward 
deployed bases to two major hubs south of the Han River.   
On the Korean peninsula, our planned enhancements and realignments are 
intended to strengthen our overall military effectiveness for the combined 
defense of the Republic of Korea.  Stationed forces will relocate away 
from the increasing congestion and sprawl of the greater Seoul area and 
will be consolidated into two major hubs in the central and southern 
sections of the country.  Rotational and rapidly deployable combat 
capabilities such as Stryker units and air expeditionary forces will 
complement these permanently stationed units.  We seek to retain a robust 
pre-positioned equipment capability in Korea to support rapid 
reinforcement.  Finally, our broader improvements to other regional 
military forces, such as the forward deployment of additional 
expeditionary maritime capabilities and long-range strike assets, will 
increase both our deterrent effect and capacity for rapid response. 
[emphasis mine]34  
                                                 
32 U.S. Department of Defense, The Strengthening U.S. Defense Posture (Washington, DC, 2004). 
33 Ibid., 12. 
34 Ibid., 12. 
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It is critical for South Korea to understand these changes in USFK in the larger 
context of implementing the U.S. GPR process than simply viewing the transformation as 
changing the security relationship within the U.S.-ROK alliance.  Since the end of the 
Cold War, Western Europe and Northeast Asia had become “springboards” for operations 
in the  Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and later, Central Asia.  As a result, the U.S. forward 
deployed forces no longer expected to fight in place.  Instead, they needed the capacity to 
project into theaters that were likely to be some distance away from their garrison.35  In 
this context, the realignment of the U.S. GPR combines a network of traditional and new 
facilities to enhance the capacity for prompt global action.  This network consists of three 
types of newly defined U.S. facilities overseas: main operating bases (MOBs); forward 
operating sites (FOSs), which are expandable “warm facilities”36 for use by rotational 
forces and maintained with limited U.S. military support presence; and cooperative 
security locations (CSLs), which are facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence 
and maintained with periodic contractor or host-nation support.37 
Among the three, Camp Humphreys in South Korea – which is located in the 
Osan-Pyungtaek area, south of Seoul where one of the two major hubs that will form 
USFK’s relocation – became an example of a Main Operating Base (MOB), together with 
Ramstein Air Base in Germany and Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan.38  The MOB, 
which is one of the significant type of facilities in the future U.S. defense global posture, 
will be characterized by command and control structures, family support facilities, and 
strengthened force protection measures, in addition to permanently stationed combat 
forces and a robust infrastructure. With the two other types of facilities – FOS, and CSL,–  
the future Camp Humphreys as a MOB will be fully integrated into the U.S. global force 
network system by serving as a key en route infrastructure in the region.  It is apparent 
that in order to enhance geographic access capability of the forward stationed U.S. forces, 
                                                 
35 Ryan Henry, “Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture,” Naval War College Review (Spring 
2006): 1. 
36 By creating these “warm” bases, FOSs are often described as “Lily Pads.” Instead of the Cold War 
idea of basing large numbers of troops to face a known enemy in a predictable place there would be a series 
of bases strung out across the world like lilies across a pond. Paul Reynolds, “U.S. Redeploying for Quick 
Action,” BBC News, August 16, 2004. According to The Strengthening U.S. Defense Posture examples of 
FOS include: Sembawang port facility in Singapore and Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras.  
37 Ibid., 7. 
38 U.S. Department of Defense, The Strengthening U.S. Defense Posture. 10. 
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such as USFK, the “deployability” based on improved mobility and flexibility is a key to 
the U.S. military transformation strategy.  Therefore, defining Camp Humphreys as a 
MOB strongly implies that the U.S. GPR is transforming the posture of USFK based on 
“strategic flexibility.”  
In sum, careful overviews of the major documents such as QDR 2001, NSS, DT 
and especially GPR clearly showed that the concept of strategic flexibility is well 
incorporated into the new U.S. international security policy and defense strategies 
developed during the first term Bush administration.  Examination of the U.S. 
international security policy development through the lens of strategic flexibility 
underscores the fact that the U.S. strategic flexibility policy toward South Korea has 
much broader and deeper implications than just relocating bases and reducing troops in 
South Korea.  Again, as discussed above, flexibility is the core concept not only in the 
U.S. defense policy toward South Korea but also in the U.S. national security strategy to 
change its overall security system to cope with the “uncertain” future.  
B. DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY WITHIN THE U.S.-
ROK SECURITY RELATIONSHIP  
The basic concept of USFK strategic flexibility was shown initially within the 
ROK-US alliance in the early 1990s.  After the end of the Cold War, as the major threat 
disappeared in the region, both the U.S.-ROK alliance and the U.S.-Japan alliance needed 
to shift the role of U.S. forces from deterring Soviet threats to contributing to regional 
stability.  This was presented in the Joint Communiqué of the 24th U.S.-ROK Security 
Consultative Meeting (SCM)39 in 1993 and thereafter, as it newly emphasized that “the 
alliance will serve to keep peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia Pacific 
region as a whole.”40  
                                                 
39 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) is a ministerial level annual meeting between the 
U.S. and ROK. The first meeting was held in Washington D.C. in 1968, and recently there was the 38th 
U.S.-ROK SCM in Washington D.C. The SCM is the highest level security talks between the two countries 
under the Secretary of Defense and Defense Minister. There is a Military Committee Meeting (MCM) 
between the both U.S. and ROK’s chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held since 1978.  
40 U.S.-ROK 25th SCM Joint Communiqué. 1993. The U.S. position changed from the previous years’ 
SCM Joint Communiqué which highlighted that “U.S. forces should remain in Korea as long as the 
governments and people of the United States and the Republic of Korea believe that they provide 
deterrence against North Korea and serve the interests of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.” 
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Furthermore, the U.S. and ROK agreed to conduct a joint study to consider 
guidelines for the long-term U.S.-ROK security relationship.41  As a result, in 1994, 
RAND in the U.S. and KIDA in Korea, both government funded research institutes, 
jointly published a report called The New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of 
the US-Korean Security Cooperation.  Among the alternatives for the future U.S.-ROK 
alliance, the report suggested a “regional security alliance” as the best policy option to 
both the U.S. and South Korean governments for their future relationship.42  
However, developing the U.S.-ROK alliance into a regional security alliance by 
changing USFK to a more regional force could not proceed further during the latter part 
of the decade due to the evolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis.  The basic USFK 
reduction plan which was specified in the East Asia Strategy Initiative in 199043 was also 
postponed and finally cancelled. Since then geopolitical aspects on the Korean peninsula 
left the USFK tied up in the peninsula mainly focusing on deterring North Korean threats 
during the rest of the decade. 
It was largely the U.S. military transformation during the first term of the Bush 
administration and the September 11 terrorist attacks which again raised the idea of 
USFK’s regional role and strategic flexibility – which had become a crucial element of 
the U.S. international security strategy – in the U.S.-ROK alliance.  However, it is 
important to note that South Korea’s constant development in its military capabilities 
backed by decades of rapid economic growth, compared with North Korea’s relative 
backwardness in its overall national strength due to years of underdevelopment, also 
heavily influenced changes in the U.S.-ROK security relationship.  Additionally, South 
Korea’s long desire to achieve “Self-Reliant Defense,” 44  coupled with growing 
                                                 
41 It was agreed upon during the SCM in 1992. 
42 Jonathan D. Pollack and Young-Koo Cha, The New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of the 
US-Korean Security Cooperation (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995) The four alternatives for the future ROK-
US alliance in the report were: 1) a robust peninsula alliance, 2) a reconfigured peninsula alliance, 3) a 
regional security alliance, and 4) a political alliance. 
43 U.S. DOD, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to the Congress (Washington, 
DC, 1990). 
Based on the East Asia Strategy Initiative in 1990, the U.S. implemented phase I (1990~1992) 
withdraw plan and as the result a total of 26,000 troops were reduced in Asia including 7,000 troops from 
South Korea. Phase II and III was never implemented.  
44 Specific details about South Korea’s “Self-Reliant Defense” will be discussed in Chapter V. 
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nationalism based on changes in the inter-Korean relationship after the historic summit 
between the two Koreas in June 2000, 45  also influenced both countries’ security 
relationship.  Therefore, not only the U.S. military transformation and the September 11 
terrorist attacks in the United States but also changes in South Korea’s security 
environment bolstered the realignment of USFK, as well as transforming the U.S.-ROK 
security relationship.  At the beginning of the new century, after maintaining an extra 
decade of the Cold War type security relationship, the changes in that security 
relationship became inevitable.   
In the 34th SCM, in 2002, the United States and ROK both agreed upon “the 
importance of adapting the alliance to changes in the global security environment” and 
“established a Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA).”46 FOTA talks became 
crucial to forming a new security relationship between the two countries based on 
changes in the USFK.  A number of significant issues within the USFK, including the 
relocation of the Yongsan Garrison, were discussed in the FOTA talks. Throughout the 
negotiations, the U.S. lobbied to change the USFK posture based on the GPR, but South 
Korea wanted assurances that the U.S. would maintain its defense commitment to South 
Korea.  To some extent, the FOTA talks were regarded as highly successful because 
many of the changes in USFK were agreed upon between the two countries.  However, at 
the same time, through the painful negotiating process, both parties apparently realized 
their different perceptions on the objectives of the alliance and the role of the USFK.  
Consequently, after 18 months of FOTA negotiations, the ROK and U.S. governments 
agreed to the following:47 
1. Relocation of U.S. forces from the Seoul metropolitan area 
2. Enhancement of combined capabilities 
3. Transfer of military missions  
4. Realignment of U.S. forces based in Korea 
                                                 
45 The leaders of the two Koreas, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jung-Il met at Pyungyang, the capital of 
North Korea in June 15, 2000. It was the first summit meeting between two Koreas in the history of ROK 
and DPRK. 
46 U.S.-ROK 34th SCM Joint Communiqué. 2002.  
47 FOTA: June 2003-August 2004.  
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It is clear that these changes in USFK, particularly transferring military missions 
and the realignment, stem from the U.S. strategic flexibility policy. The term “strategic 
flexibility” first appeared in the 35th SCM, in November 2003, at the same time 
emphasizing the issues discussed in the FOTA talks.48 The 35th SCM announcement 
occurred right before the aforementioned public speech by Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy Douglas Faith regarding transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture in the 
following month.  
On May 15, 2004, the United States surprised the ROK government with the 
announcement that it would dispatch the Second Brigade of the Second Infantry Division, 
about 3,600 troops, to Iraq.  Moreover, within less than a month, on June 6, the United 
States also delivered its plan to withdraw 12,500 troops from South Korea by December 
2005.  Although there were some adjustments later on the issue of withdrawing 12,500 
troops by extending its due date to the end of 2008, this was clearly the beginning 
execution of strategic flexibility within USFK and also implicated the future changing 
role of USFK.  Since then, there have been many examples demonstrating the expanding 
role of USFK and its flexible use.  The joint statements in the 2004 and 2005 SCMs both 
reemphasized strategic flexibility by “reaffirming the continuing importance of the 
strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in the ROK.”49  In this context, in May 2005, Gen. 
Charles Cambell, Commander of the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, stated in public that 
“the U.S.-ROK alliance is transforming into a regional alliance and that the operational 
sphere of the U.S.-ROK joint forces can be extended to Northeast Asia,” 50  which 
reflected U.S. intentions to make the U.S.-ROK alliance a regional alliance. 
Gen. Cambell’s announcement ignited huge debates within South Korea about the 
strategic flexibility of USFK.  The core debate questioned whether the strategic flexibility 
                                                 
48 The 35th SCM Joint Communiqué article four says that “Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister Cho 
expressed satisfaction with the results to date of the Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative 
(FOTA), which began in 2003, and continues in 2004. They reviewed agreements for the relocation of US 
forces from the Seoul metropolitan area, enhancement of combined capabilities, transfer of military 
missions, and the realignment of US forces based in Korea. Both agreed that these initiatives, once fully 
implemented, will modernize and strengthen the alliance while adapting it to changes in the global security 
environment. In this regard, the Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed the continuing importance of the 
strategic flexibility of United States forces in the Republic of Korea.” 
49 U.S.-ROK 35 ~ 36th SCM Joint Communiqués. 2003 ~ 2004.  
50 “U.S.-ROK Alliance Heading toward Regional Alliance (Hanmidongmaengeu 
jieokdongmanghwa),” Chosunilbo, May 25, 2005.  
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of USFK benefited South Korea’s national interest or not, and how it would change the 
U.S.-ROK security relationship.  It was clear that because of USFK’s changing posture as 
an expeditionary force there was a possibility for South Korea to become entangled 
within a regional conflict unintentionally. Moreover, transforming USFK to a more 
regional force could lessen the deterrence to North Korea which was the major role of the 
U.S. Forces stationed in Korea since the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty.  In this context, in 
March 2005, the South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun made a speech at the South 
Korean Air Force Academy that “Korea will never be involved in conflicts in Northeast 
Asia without our consent” and that “this is a firm principle that can never be 
compromised.”51 
However, on January 19, 2006, the U.S. and ROK launched the Strategic 
Consultation for Allied Partnership (SCAP) and the long debated strategic flexibility of 
USFK was officially agreed upon between the two countries:   
Regarding the issue of strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in the ROK, 
Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Ban confirmed the understanding of 
both governments as follows: The ROK, as an ally, fully understands the 
rationale for the transformation of the U.S. global military strategy, and 
respects the necessity for strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces in the ROK. 
In the implementation of strategic flexibility, the U.S. respects the ROK 
position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast 
Asia against the will of the Korean people.52 [emphasis mine]  
Regarding the agreement on strategic flexibility, many South Koreans strongly criticized 
their government on accepting the strategic flexibility commitments of USFK, and some 
radical social groups requested immediate cancellation of the agreement.  The agreement 
was regarded as a “document of surrender” to the United States by the South Korean 
public.53  Many argued that the term “respect” is not sufficient and specific enough to 
guarantee South Korea’s security from unintended involvement in potential regional 
conflicts.  This criticism worsened when one of the National Assembly members released 
                                                 
51 “Strategic Flexibility must not Risk South Korea (Jeonlakjeok yuyeonseong, hangu anbo 
wihyupmalaya),” Chosunilbo, March 9, 2005. 
52 U.S.-ROK SCAP Joint Statement. 2006. 
53 Chul-Kee Lee, “Strategic Flexibility of U.S. Forces in Korea,” 1. 
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the “December 2005 ROK NSC meeting document (NSC 355).”54  According to the 
document, the South Korean government could not reach agreement with the U.S. on the 
issue of establishing a “prior consultation process” 55 as part of  U.S. strategic flexibility 
policy, which is viewed as a method to limit the strategic flexibility of USFK.  Also, 
regarding the USFK’s regional role, the document suggested an approval from the 
National Assembly might be needed prior to the agreement on strategic flexibility with 
the United States, because it could be interpreted as violating the U.S.-ROK Mutual 
Security Treaty in 1950 56  – which never happened.  Therefore, the South Korean 
government’s diplomatic inability within the negotiation process and also the legitimacy 
of the agreement has been highly debated since then. 
Although details of the negotiation process was never released to the South 
Korean public, it was generally accepted that South Korea had no choice but to make an 
agreement with U.S. strategic flexibility due to the importance of maintaining its security 
relationship with the United States.  Consequently, it became clear that South Korea 
would accept the basic changes of USFK’s role in the Korean peninsula, and must 
seriously consider the implications of strategic flexibility for its own security and also for 
future U.S.-ROK alliance.  
C. U.S. STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY POLICY AND REALIGNMENT OF 
USFK 
It is necessary to examine how the actual changes in USFK realignment are 
closely related to the U.S. strategic flexibility policy toward South Korea.  The USFK is 
under the process of fundamental realignment for the first time in its history. Realignment 
mainly includes 1) troop reduction, 2) base relocation, 3) changing force structure, 4) 
transferring missions, and 5) transferring wartime Operational Command and Control 
(OPCON).  Close examination of the details of the realignment clearly indicate that it 
will increase the flexibility of USFK.  Through the realignment, ground forces will be 
                                                 
54 Jae-Chun Choi, “Criticizing the Agreement on Strategic Flexibility (Junlakjeok yuyeonseong hapeu 
bipan),” Ohmynews, January 23, 2006.  
55 “What Happened in NSC Meeting in December 29, 2005? (12/29 NSC sangim wiwonheoeseo 
mosunili iteotna?)” Ohmynews, February 1, 2006.  
56 It is debated that U.S. strategic flexibility is violating Article II and III of the U.S.-ROK Mutual 
Security Treaty, which defined the condition of exercising force in case that either of the parties are 
threatened by external armed attack in either of the parties’ territories in the Pacific area. U.S.-ROK Mutual 
Security Treaty. October 1, 1953. 
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reduced while the Navy and Air Force capabilities are likely to be increased.  Moreover, 
the remaining ground forces are expected to be transformed into a more agile and flexible 
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). Overall, relocating the bases to more easily 
deployable locations and changing forces to SBCT apparently show the changing role of 
USFK from solely deterring North Korea to a regional multi-purpose force.   
1. Troop Reduction 
Before the 2nd brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division with its 3,600 troops left for 
Iraq in 2004, the total number of U.S. troops in Korea was around 37,500-28,300 Army 
and 8,700 Air Force.57  Through the FOTA talks during in 2004, the U.S. and ROK 
decided to reduce strength by 12,500 USFK troops, including the 3,600 already 
dispatched to Iraq.  The withdrawal will be accomplished in a three phase reduction plan 
concluding in 2008.  Phase I has been implemented, reducing 5,000 troops from the 3rd 
battle brigade by 2004.  The phase II is scheduled to bring back 5,000 troops mainly from 
ground and air support by 2006.  Finally, the phase III reduction will include 2,500 
ground support troops by the end of 2008.  However, counter-firing assets such as MLRS 
(Multiple Launch Rocket System) and counter-battery radars were excluded from 
withdrawal due to their importance for deterring North Korea.  As a result, there will be 
25,000 USFK troops remaining in the Korean peninsula after 2009.  
2. Base Relocation  
Relocating bases is a crucial element in the realignment process.  The USFK 
bases have not been relocated since they were first established at the end of the Korean 
War. A Military base is a place where military forces are stationed in order to accomplish 
military objectives based on strategy; thus, relocation of military bases is critically related 
to the objectives of military strategy.  Relocation clearly reflects the idea of increasing 
strategic flexibility of the USFK.  Broadly, the relocation plan contains returning 
Yongsan base to Seoul city58 and pulling back all USFK bases near the DMZ and north 
of the Han River to the two hubs to the south of Han River, Osan-Pyungtaek and Daegu-
                                                 
57 There are fewer than 500 U.S. Navy and Marines personnel stationed in South Korea.  
58 The first attempt to relocate the USFK Yongsan Garrison started in the early 1990s. However, 
mainly due to its excessive relocation expenses, the project had been put on hold since June 1993. The two 
countries eventually made an agreed on the principles of the relocating Yongsan Garrison at the U.S.-ROK 
Summit in May 2003.  
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Busan.59  At the end of the Korean War, most of the ground bases were located near the 
DMZ and along the expected routes from the DMZ to Seoul.  Since then, it is widely 
believed that the forward deployed U.S. ground forces served as “tripwire”60 by engaging 
the United States into the war automatically with their sacrifice during a North Korean 
invasion.  The relocation of the bases north of the Han River will end this role of 
“tripwire” and increase the survivability of the U.S. ground forces.  However, at the same 
time this can be perceived as weakening the U.S. capabilities to deter an invasion by the 
North.   
The 2nd Infantry Division bases will be relocated in two phases.  In phase I, all the 
bases north of the Han River will be integrated into Camp Casey in Dongduchon and 
Camp Red Cloud in Uijeongbu, which are located between the DMZ and Seoul by 2006.  
In phase II, most of the bases of the 2nd Infantry Division will be relocated to Camp 
Humphreys in Pyungtaek.  However, even after the completion of phase II, the U.S. 
military rotational training presence north of the Han River will be sustained.61  
3. Changing Force Structure 
After the 7th Infantry Division left Korea in 1979, the 2nd Infantry Division 
became the only ground force deterring the million man North Korean army.  Since that 
time, the 2nd Infantry Division has been the symbol of the U.S. defense commitment to 
South Korea, designed to counter the North’s ground attack by its heavy armed and 
artillery forces.  Changing the force structure of the 2nd Infantry Division to a more 
flexible and deployable force is the core of the transformation.62  Basically, the ground 
force structure will be changed from a formal Division-focused structure to a Brigade-
                                                 
59 Seong-Ryoul Cho, “The Realignment of USFK and the U.S.-ROK Alliance in Transition,” in The 
United States and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century (Vermont: Ashgate), 104. “USFK reduction 
and its relocation to south of the Han River were intended to have a flexible setup in order to cope with new 
threats and uncertainties from China. … This plan was to minimize the conflict with Korean residents and 
to maintain a stable USFK presence and to expand the USFK brief to encompass regional roles.  
60 The role of the USFK has been largely regarded as a “tripwire.” It means because of its forward 
deployment near the DMZ, in case of North Korea’s unexpected invasion or heavy artillery attack, it will 
be the first force to encounter North Korean forces and mostly sacrificed in the war. Therefore, it will bring 
an automatic increase in support of South Korea from the United States. Doug Bandow, Tripwire: Korea 
and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed War (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1996), 33-55. 
61 U.S.-ROK Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) 2nd Joint Statement. June 5, 2003. 
62 Cho, “The Realignment of USFK and the U.S.-ROK Alliance in Transition,” 104. It is argued in the 
article that the USFK will be transformed to the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). 
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level Unit of Action (UA) within the new combat system.63  These UAs will be able to 
carry out their own independent operations.  Therefore, the 2nd Infantry Division will 
consist of two UAs.  The remaining 1st Brigade will be transformed into Heavy Brigade 
Combat Team (HBCT), and all the air assets will be integrated into the new Multi-
Functional Aviation Brigade (MFAB).  The new Brigades will consist of 5-7 Battalions 
(a current Brigade consists of 2-3 battalions).  In addition, in order to support the forces 
in and out of the peninsula, a “Sustainment Brigade” is planned to be founded.   
The details of transforming the 2nd Infantry Division clearly reflect the 
implementation of strategic flexibility policy.  Namely, increasing battalions to 5-7 
indicates that they will be flexibly dispatched to places out of the peninsula depending on 
the situation and their mission.  Lighter forces are considered to be more agile and easily 
deployable.  This force structure will be more efficient and adaptable to low intensity 
conflicts, MOOTWS (Military Operation Other Than War) and also to counter-terrorism 
situations.   
4. Transferring Missions 
During the FOTA negotiation in 2003-2004, both sides agreed on transferring 
certain military missions of USFK to ROK forces by 2006. 64   By transferring the 
following ten major military missions which were mainly to counter a North Korean 
attack, the ROK forces’ role in defense of the peninsula will be expanded while the U.S. 
forces will have more flexibility in their force structure.  The ten missions include: rear-
area decontamination, Joint Security Area (JSA) security, mine emplacement, air-to-
ground range management, counter-fire headquarters, maritime Counter-Special 
Operations Forces (C-SOF) interdiction, Military Police (MP) rotation and control, 
Search and Rescue (SAR), Close Air Support (CAS) and weather forecasting.  Most of 
the missions have been transferred to ROK forces during the last three years.  One of the 
South Korean concerns was regarding the issue of transferring the counter-fire 
headquarters thus it was agreed on to evaluate the ROK capability periodically before  
 
                                                 
63 Cho, “The Realignment of USFK and the U.S.-ROK Alliance in Transition,” 104. “According to the 
U.S. Military Transformation, the 8th U.S. Army Command is to be changed into UEy (Unit of 
Employment Y), and the 2nd Infantry Division Command into UEx.  
64 U.S.-ROK 2nd FOTA Joint Statement. June 5, 2003.  
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transferring the mission.  But recently ROK army created a Guided Missile Headquarter 
to carry out the counter-fire mission and as a result the counter-fire mission was 
transferred to ROK forces.65  
5. Transferring Wartime Operational Command and Control 
Transferring the wartime Operational Command and Control (OPCON) is another 
debated issue within the alliance together with the strategic flexibility of USFK.  The 
OPCON of ROK forces was originally transferred to the United Nation Command (UNC) 
during the Korean War in 1950 and was maintained until 1978, when the U.S.-ROK 
Combined Forces Command (CFC) was formed. Since then, the OPCON has been under 
the authority of the CFC Commander.66  In 1994 the OPCON was divided to wartime and 
peacetime OPCON, and in response to the strong request of South Korean president Roh 
Tae-Woo, the peacetime OPCON was assigned to ROK.   
From South Korea’s perspective, recovering the wartime OPCON from USFK has 
been the symbol of eliminating the asymmetrical patron-client relationship with United 
States, and finally achieving self-reliant national defense.  South Koreans have long 
desired full sovereignty over its military command.  Most of the people in South Korea 
support recovering wartime OPCON eventually, but they differ on the timing.  
Conservatives and most former military officers argue that South Korea is still not ready 
to defend itself, and insist that the CFC system must remain in order to successfully deter 
North Korea.  More liberals insist that the ROK should recover wartime OPCON as soon 
as possible.67  In this context, from the beginning of his administration, South Korean 
President Roh announced that South Korea should take the initiative and begin 
negotiations with the United States to take over the wartime OPCON.68  
                                                 
65 ROK Army Guided Missile Command was founded in September 28, 2006.  
66 On July 14, 1950 South Korean President Rhee sent a letter to General MacArthur, the Commander 
of the UNC, saying that he would hand over the ‘Command Authority,’ and MacArthur replied, accepting 
the Operational Command transfer.  
67 Dong-Man Seo, “Recovering Wartime OPCON and South Korea’s Security Concerns (Jeonsi 
jakjeontongjegwon hwansoowa hangukeu anbo gaeneom),” Pressian Korean Peninsula Briefing 17, 
August 16, 2006. 
68 Through various speeches and announcements since 2003, president Roh has strongly argued that 
South Korea must take over the wartime OPCON from the United States in ten years. In August 2006, 
president Roh told the Yonhap news agency that Korea is capable of exercising sole wartime operational 
control of its troops “even if we get it back now.” “Roh under Fire Over Wartime Command Withdrawal,” 
Chosunilbo, August 10, 2006.  
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During the 37th U.S.-ROK SCM in 2005, the two parties agreed to “appropriately 
accelerate discussions on command relations and wartime operational control.”69 It is 
known that although the United States agreed to transfer the wartime OPCON to South 
Korea, the two countries differed on the timeline of the transfer.  The U.S. wants to 
transfer it by 2009, when the phase I of the U.S. base relocations to Osan-Pyungtaek area 
are about to be completed, whereas the ROK prefers to take over by 2012, after the first 
stage of its Defense Reform plan has implemented.  Finally, it was agreed upon during 
the U.S.-ROK 38th SCM on October 2006 that the transition of OPCON to the ROK will 
be after October 15, 2009 but not later than March 15, 2012.70  
 The transition of wartime OPCON from USFK to ROK forces is also critically 
related to the strategic flexibility and the transforming of USFK.  It will bring many more 
responsibilities to South Korea for its own defense; at the same time, the U.S. forces will 
be able focus more on other missions outside of the peninsula. 
D. THE STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY OF THE USFK  
An overview of the major documents and agreements of both countries clarified 
that strategic flexibility is one of the main components in the U.S. international security 
strategy.  It also showed how the U.S. strategic flexibility policy was developed 
throughout the U.S.-ROK security relationship.  The QDR 2001 and GPR clearly 
demonstrated the importance of strategic flexibility in the U.S. security policy.  Through 
the SCMs and FOTA talks, and later SCAP, the United States and South Korea were able 
to agree on the realignment of the USFK based on strategic flexibility.  
To cope with uncertain security environments in Northeast Asia, the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy emphasized the agility and flexibility of U.S. forces deployed in the 
region.  In this context, the USFK is transforming itself to regional forces.  Downsizing 
the troops will allow more flexibility in its deployment out of the peninsula.  Relocating 
and integrating current dispersed bases near the DMZ to the two hub bases south of the 
Han River will increase not only survivability but also efficiency in its deployment to 
other places in the region.  Moreover, the new bases in the Osan and Pyungtaek area are 
                                                 
69 In the Joint Statement of the U.S.-ROK 37th SCM in 2005, the U.S. and ROK “agreed to 
appropriately accelerate discussion on command relations and wartime operational control.”  
70 U.S.-ROK 38th SCM Joint Communiqué. October 20, 2006. 
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more weighted toward the Air Force and Navy than Army.71 The advantages of the 
current U.S. 7th Air Force Command in Osan and ROK Navy 2nd Fleet Command in 
Pyungtaek will be fully utilized within the realignment.  The USFK’s agility and 
flexibility will certainly be increased based on enhanced naval and air lift capability. 72  
Changing the 2nd Infantry Division to Brigade level UAs will greatly enhance its mobility.  
Transferring major USFK missions and also wartime OPCON to ROK forces will 
certainly reduce its responsibility in deterring North Korea. Therefore, it is clear that the 
strategic flexibility of USFK will be greatly enhanced through the overall USFK 
realignment process.  Every aspect of the transformation indicates that USFK is posturing 
for a more regional role than just constraining itself within the peninsula and providing 
deterrence to the North Korean military threat.  
As for South Korea, the increasing strategic flexibility of USFK has more 
implications than just changing its role to perform as a regional force.  First of all, it will 
have great influence on South Korea’s defense policies as the ROK forces take more 
responsibility in its defense.  Under the continuous military threat from North Korea, the 
deterrence of North Korea’s military ambition toward the South will remain vital to its 
survival.  Secondly, it could change inter-Korean relations.  North Korea has always been 
sensitive to changes in the U.S.-ROK military relationship.  There is a possibility that 
North Korea could react to frequent movement of the USFK as it performs a regional role.  
Thirdly, expanding the role of USFK from the peninsula to the region could bring 
concerns from the other regional actors.  China will be the first to respond to the regional 
role of USFK, as it had already condemned the regional role of USFJ as the U.S.-Japan 
alliance enlarged its military cooperation.  Last but most importantly, the transforming of 
USFK could possibly change South Korea’s long unchanged security relationship with  
 
                                                 
71 During the Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee Military Strategy and Operational 
Requirements in the FY 2007 Defense Budget in Mar 7 2006, General Bell, Commander of the USFK 
noted that, “In the future, to support the ROK… I envision U.S. military contributions to the alliance to be 
air-and naval-centric.” 
72 Chang-Hee Nam and others, “U.S.-Japan-Korea Security Cooperation in the Changing Defense 
Posture of the U.S. Forces in Northeast Asia,” Korea Observer 37, no. 3 (2006): 475. “Pyungtaek and Osan 
areas will perfectly serve the purposes for the transformed USFK on the peninsula. Osan and Pyungtaek 
areas are close to each other, and Camp Humpreys in Pyungtaek is close to the large naval port hosting 
South Korea’s 2nd Fleet Command. Both bases are conveniently located for air lift and sea lift operations, 
which the Pentagon’s so-called military transformation requires.”  
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the United States.  As the USFK becomes a regional force, there are greater possibilities 
that the U.S.-ROK alliance could be transformed into a more regionally active alliance 
than just confronting the North’s military threat.   
Therefore, the U.S. strategic flexibility policy has many aspects that could 
decisively influence the security environments surrounding South Korea.  Potential 
impacts of U.S. strategic flexibility must be carefully overviewed in this regard.  The 
following chapters in the thesis will further discuss these implications of the U.S. 
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III. THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE TRANSFORMATION AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH KOREA 
There are two main purposes in this case study on the transformation of the U.S.-
Japan alliance.  As the USFJ is also under an unprecedented realignment process initiated 
by the U.S. military transformation plan, this chapter first examines how the U.S.-Japan 
alliance is changing under U.S. military transformation. Then the similarities and 
differences from changes in the U.S.-ROK alliance are also discussed.  This helps 
understanding the relationship between the U.S.-Japan transformation and the U.S. 
strategic flexibility policy toward South Korea.  Secondly, through the three basic 
agreements regarding the transformation,73 this chapter goes over the ways in which 
Japan responded to U.S. military transformation and examines the implications for South 
Korea.  Considering that Japan is strengthening its security relationship with the United 
States through transformation, this will be very helpful for South Korea as it considers its 
policy options toward the U.S. strategic flexibility policy which not only reflect its 
security interests but also could bolster the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
In order to achieve these two purposes, the development of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance since the end of the Cold War is discussed in historical context.  This is 
necessary to understand the characteristics of the U.S.-Japan alliance and find out the 
differences to the U.S.-ROK alliances.  After the general overview on the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, the transformation of the U.S.-Japan alliance based on the recent U.S.-Japan 
Security Council Committee (Two-Plus-Two)74 agreements between the two countries 
are examined.  The issues such as, what are the purpose of the transformation, what are 
the implications of the USFJ realignment, and why and how is it different from changes 
in the U.S.-ROK alliance, are addressed in this part.  Differences between the two forces 
in the actual realignment process are also identified.  
                                                 
73 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Joint Statement. February 29, 2005.  
U.S.-Japan SCC Document, U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future. 
October 29, 2005. U.S.-Japan SCC Document, U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation. May 
1, 2006. 
74 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (or Two-Plus-Two) is a ministerial-level 
meeting in which the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Minister of State for Defense (also Director-General of the Defense Agency) participate.  
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Considering the current debates and oppositions to the U.S. strategic flexibility 
policy within South Korea, it is important to go over Japan’s reactions toward the U.S.-
Japan alliance transformation process.  Although there were some problems between the 
two countries over the realignment process such as burden sharing issues,75 the overall 
transformation process was considered highly successful in terms of further strengthening 
the alliance.  Lastly, the overall implications from the U.S.-Japan alliance transformation 
to the U.S.-ROK alliance are discussed.   
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE  
The U.S.-Japan alliance is considered one of the most successful bilateral security 
relationships in the post-World War II era.  This was possible because of the many 
adjustments that were made within the alliance as circumstances changed during the Cold 
War.  The revision of the Security Treaty in 1960 basically reaffirmed the U.S. 
commitment to defend Japan although it was undertaken in the course of huge domestic 
protests in Japan.  In 1969 Okinawa was returned to Japan by the agreement in the 
Nixon-Sato communiqué which also emphasized the presence of the U.S. forces in Asia, 
and enhanced the alliance.  The Nixon shocks76 in 1971-1972 caused Japan to seriously 
mistrusts its relationship with the United States, yet the alliance was deliberately 
maintained.  In 1978, for the first time, the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense 
Cooperation was announced and implemented.  In 1981, under the U.S. strategies to 
contain the Soviet Union, Japan pledged to assume responsibility for sea-lane defense out 
to 1,000 nautical miles.  Finally, by playing a critical role in maintaining peace and 
stability in the region, the U.S.-Japan alliance successfully contributed to the end of the 
Cold War in the Asia Pacific region.  
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Certainly the Cold War had enhanced the geo-strategic value of Japan as playing 
a critical role in the U.S. security strategy in Asia.77  The security ties between the United 
States and Japan were essentially a result of the Cold War.  In this context, the end of the 
Cold War brought about a new security perception in the region.78  Instead of the strong 
bilateral alliance based on a clear common threat, the notion of “cooperative security” 
became more pervasive. Japan was seeking a more multilateral framework such as 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), and 
Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP).  
The Higuchi Report79 by the “Higuchi Commission,” the advisory group to the 
Prime Minister in August 1994, recommended that Japan should enhance its alliance with 
the United States.  However, more emphasis was on the importance of multilateral 
security cooperation. 80   Patrick Cronin and Michael Green argued in their book 
Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 1994 that, “Tokyo is questioning the longevity and 
vitality of the bilateral alliance…the U.S.-Japan alliance is on shakier ground… All 
things being equal the U.S.-Japan alliance is Japan’s first choice, but there is a growing 
question about whether it should be the only choice.”81 
Japan was questioning the longevity and vitality of the bilateral alliance with the 
U.S. and the alliance was on shaky ground.  At the same time, the U.S. security policy 
toward Asia was also shifting.  The U.S. began to reduce its troops from its forward bases 
in the region according to the East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI) I of 1990.82  These 
withdrawals of U.S. forces in Asia were clearly understood as a weakening of the U.S. 
security commitment to its allies in the region such as Japan and South Korea. On the 
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other hand, as the Cold War ended, trade and economy issues began to override security 
issues within the alliance; hence, Japan’s defense cooperation with the United States 
could no longer counterbalance the growing trade frictions with the United States.  
Overall, the alliance was adrift.83  
However, the security environment in this period mainly contributed to restoring 
the diverging U.S.-Japan alliance.  North Korea’s nuclear development program (1992-
1994) and missile tests (1998), in addition to the Taiwan Strait Crisis (1996) provided 
more rationales to strengthen the alliance.  Most importantly, in this period Japan began 
to play a more active role in international security issues.  Lessons from the Gulf War on 
“checkbook diplomacy” were critical in changing Japanese perception on participating 
actively in international affairs.  
In this context, in Japan the new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) 84 in 
1994 clearly emphasized the significance of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.  On 
the U.S. side, the 1995 East Asia Strategy Report (EASR) I85 better known as the “Nye 
Initiative,” changed the U.S. security policy in the region to maintain 100,000 troops in 
East Asia and Japan’s active role in international security was recognized in the 
alliance.86   
The 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century 
(Joint Declaration)87 decisively changed the alliance by enlarging its scope from narrow 
bilateral interests to more regional and global interests.  In 1997, The Guidelines for U.S.-
Japan Defense Cooperation (Defense Guidelines) stressed the significance of cooperation 
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in “situations in areas surrounding Japan.”88  Again by broadening the scope of the 
alliance from defending Japan to the security of the region, the United States and Japan 
strategically incorporated their national interests within the alliance.  Consequently, 
despite challenges to the U.S.-Japan alliance in the early 1990s after the end of the Cold 
War, the U.S.-Japan alliance was successfully enhanced and prepared to change the 
alliance to a “regional and global alliance.”  
  Accordingly, it is important to note the differences between the two 
alliances.89  While the U.S.-ROK alliance had not changed much from focusing on the 
North Korean threat from the beginning of the alliance until after the end of the Cold 
War, 90  the U.S.-Japan alliance successfully managed to adapt itself to security 
environment changes since the end of the Cold War by broadening the scope of the 
alliance.  Moreover, while the Joint Declaration and the new Defense Guidelines 
between the United States and Japan in the mid-1990s became the turning point to 
revitalize the U.S.-Japan alliance, there were no serious efforts within the United States 
and South Korean governments to reconsider the rationale and the vision of the U.S.-
ROK alliance.  These rather different developments in their security relationships with 
the United States particularly after the end of the Cold War, were the main causes of later 
differences in their recognition of U.S. forces’ transformations in each country.   
B. THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE TRANSFORMATION 
1.  The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century 
Imbalanced developments in both the U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan alliances during 
the 1990s became worse at the beginning of the 21st century.91  South Korean president 
Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine policy finally brought about the historic Pyungyang Summit 
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between the two leaders of the Koreas in June 2000, and a subsequent reconciliation 
process in inter-Korean relations.  Kim’s successor, president Roh Moo-Hyun 
consistently supported and maintained the Sunshine policy toward North Korea despite 
strong opposition from South Korean conservatives as well as from the United States.  
Meanwhile, the Bush administration in the United States had different views and 
approaches toward both Koreas from its predecessor.  The Clinton Administration’s 
“engagement” policy toward North Korea abruptly turned into a “containment” or 
“malign neglect” policy. 92   A rift between the two old strong allies was further 
aggravated by their different perceptions on North Korea.   
While the U.S.-ROK alliance was adrift, the U.S.-Japan alliance became even 
stronger. The challenge from the rising power of China consistently remained the main 
impetus for the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 21st century.  Realistically, the United States 
regarded China as a “peer competitor” challenging its global hegemony, and Japan 
regarded China as a regional rival economically and militarily.  On the other hand, North 
Korea became a more imminent and clear threat to the alliance.  North Korea’s consistent 
development of nuclear weapons and means of delivery justified the cooperation of 
constructing a regional missile defense system by the United States and Japan.  In this 
respect, the U.S.-Japan alliance was critical to both the United States and Japan to cope 
with China as well as North Korea.  Moreover, the alliance enabled the United States to 
maintain its strong influence in the Asia Pacific region and to Japan the alliance became 
the foundation to expand its role in the international community.93   
Meanwhile, the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 
compelled further enhancement of the U.S.-Japan security relationships.94  Japan offered 
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its full support and assistance to the U.S. in its war against terrorism.  In Afghanistan, 
Japan dispatched its Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) first to escort U.S. ships but 
later to provide rear-area support in the Indian Ocean.  During the war in Afghanistan, 
Japan passed an anti-terrorism bill to enable the SDF to provide non-combat and 
humanitarian assistance to the United States and to the multinational forces.  Despite 
massive domestic protests, the Japanese government sent the SDF to Iraq, which was still 
a combat zone. Once again war contingency bills were passed to support U.S. operations.  
Therefore, Japan’s active participation in the U.S. war on terrorism further strengthened 
the alliance, but at the same time it also ensured Japan’s increasing assertiveness to play 
an active role in international affairs.95   
Two strategies were contained in Japan’s active participation in the U.S. global 
war on terror.  First, by supporting the United States, Japan strongly desired to maintain a 
firm U.S.-Japan security relationship.  Second, by actively participating in international 
security cooperation, Japan wanted to be a more important member in the international 
community.  Therefore, Japan’s willingness to play an active role in the international 
community influenced the U.S.-Japan alliance to expand its scope more globally.  During 
the Cold War the U.S.-Japan alliance mainly focused on the security of Japan.  After the 
end of the Cold War, by overcoming a period of drift, the alliance expanded its role to a 
more regional alliance.  Finally, in the post-September 11 era, the U.S.-Japan alliance is 
trying to transform itself into a global alliance.96  
By this time it was clear that even before the agreements on transforming the 
alliance, the U.S.-Japan alliance was heading toward a regional and global alliance.  In 
this context, there is an important difference between the U.S.-ROK and the U.S.-Japan 
alliances that is contained in the original purposes of the U.S. forces’ realignment 
processes in each country.  In South Korea, the main purpose of the USFK realignment is 
to change and expand its role in the region and to some extent beyond the region, based  
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on the U.S. strategic flexibility policy.  Therefore, strategic flexibility is considered the 
most important concept in the overall transformation of the USFK as well as in 
transforming the U.S.-ROK alliance.   
The situation is different in the U.S.-Japan alliance.  As examined, the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, in many aspects, had already expanded its role into the region and beyond the 
region, and was engaged in partially carrying out these extended roles.  In the region, the 
USFJ is now considered, within the alliance but also to other regional actors, as the U.S. 
military presence to check China’s military buildup in the region, rather than for 
defending Japan from an external military threat.  Besides, it is less convincing that the 
JSDF cannot defend its own country without U.S. support, as the threat from the Soviet 
Union has disappeared.  In terms of North Korea’s threat, Japan’s own defense capability 
exceeds North Korea’s conventional weapons, except for its nuclear weapons. 97  
Therefore, considering the current status of the alliance, and also Japan’s active interests 
in expanding the alliance, the need for strategic flexibility as a compelling reason to 
expand the role of U.S. forces in the region cannot be as strongly defended as in the U.S.-
ROK alliance.  Instead, the core of the transformation in Japan is the substantial change 
of the U.S. force structure as well as the alliance structure, to more effectively carry out 
the regional or global role that was already largely implemented since the revitalization 
of the alliance over the last decade.   
2. Transforming the U.S.-Japan Alliance  
Similar to the USFK, the USFJ is also under a transformation process originally 
initiated by the U.S. military transformation and GPR.  The realignment of the USFJ 
discusses the changes in roles, missions, and capabilities of the U.S. forces but also of the 
JSDF, to respond effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner.  It is 
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the transformation is not confined to the realignment of USFJ.  The United States and 
Japan are constructing their national security and defense policy together, in the context 
of changing regional and global security circumstances.98   
Although the U.S.-Japan alliance became stronger than ever at the advent of the 
new century, both countries recognized that they must transform their security 
relationship based on more effective and advanced alliance system in order to carry out 
regional and global roles.  In the Security Council Committee (SCC) on December 2002, 
the alliance transformation was first agreed upon by launching the Defense Policy 
Review Initiative (DPRI) between the two countries.  Then, through vigorous and 
intensive transformation negotiation, the U.S. and Japan announced a series of joint 
statements during 2005-2006.  Based on the SCC, they announced three major 
agreements on transforming the alliance:   
a. U.S.-Japan SCC Joint Statement (Joint Statement) on February 19, 2005 
b. U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future 
(Midterm  Report) on October 29, 2005 
c. U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Roadmap) on May 
1, 2006 
By transforming the U.S.-Japan alliance through these agreements, two main goals are 
established.  The first is to further enhance the capabilities of the alliance to cope with 
regional and global security issues, and the second is to further strengthen U.S.-Japan 
security and defense cooperation.   
The Joint Statement in 2005, just like the Joint Declaration in 1996, became a 
basis for the future alliance transformation.  At first the U.S. and Japan shared the same 
views of the current security environment affecting the alliance, such as international 
terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), modernization of 
military capabilities in the region, and North Korea returning to the Six-Party talks.  




                                                 
98 Hwa-Seop Song, “Transforming the U.S.-Japan Alliance to the Normal Alliance (Miil 
dongmaengeu byunhyukgwa botongdongmaengwha)” Defense Policy Research (2006): 45. 
44 
common strategic objectives for the alliance.  In the first step to transform the alliance, 
agreement on the objectives for the alliance became the foundation for the transformation 
process and for the future of an effective and capable alliance.99   
To achieve common strategic objectives, the roles, missions and capabilities of 
the U.S. forces and JSDF were reexamined and agreed upon through the Midterm Report 
in October titled U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future. 
Newly defined roles, missions and capabilities focused on:: 
a. Bilateral cooperation in international activities such as the fight against 
terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), assistance to Iraq, and 
disaster relief following the tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the 
earthquake in South Asia. 
b. Japan's December 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines. 
c. Progress in ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation. 
d. Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies.  
e. The SDF's planned transition to a new joint operations posture. 
f. The transformation and global posture realignment of U.S. forces. 
Even before the agreement on the USFK’s strategic flexibility became an issue 
between the United States and South Korea, because of its implications for USFK 
becoming a regional force, it is clear with the above two agreements in 2005 the United 
States and Japan finally and officially defined and announced the U.S.-Japan alliance as a 
regional as well as a global security alliance.  It is obvious that the United States and 
Japan are willing to transform the alliance to a global alliance by expanding the role of 
USFJ and JSDF to all the international security activities such as counter-terrorism and 
counter-proliferation operations (e.g., PSI).100  Most importantly, unlike the U.S. and 
South Korean relationship, there was no different perception between the United States 
and Japan on the active role of the U.S.-Japan alliance within the region and also beyond 
the region.  They shared common national interests in this extended alliance relationship.  
The common objectives, roles and missions clearly reflect the both countries’ broader 
interests within the alliance beyond defense of Japan.  Consequently, while the 
transformation of USFK was perceived by South Koreans as a factor further deteriorating 
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the relationship between the United States and South Korea, in Japan, the transformation 
of the U.S.-Japan alliance to regional and global alliance was certainly recognized within 
both countries as contributing to a more advanced and effective alliance.   
3. Realignment of the USFJ 
Under the common strategic objectives and with newly defined roles, missions 
and capabilities, the details of realignment were agreed upon between the two countries.  
In May 2006, the transformation roadmap was completed.  The Roadmap confirmed the 
specifics of the realignments in the U.S.-Japan force structure.  Important changes in the 
force structures are:   
a. Realignment on Okinawa: construction of the Futenma Replacement 
Facility, relocating 8,000 marines to Guam by 2014, and returning lands of 
the Futenma and Kadena bases.   
b. Transforming the U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp 
Zama.  Establishing the Headquarters of the Ground SDF Central 
Readiness Force.  
c. Relocating Air SDF Air Defense Command (ADC) to Yokota Air base.  
d. Relocating Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air 
Station Iwakuni. 
e. Deploying a new U.S. X-Band radar system to Air SDF Shariki Base for 
Missile Defense.  
f. Relocating aircraft training sites from Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni to 
designated SDF bases.  
Two rather distinguished purposes were contained in the realignment 
implementation.  One is to reduce the burdens on local communities in Okinawa, which 
began roughly after the Okinawa rape incident in 1995, through the Special Action 
Committee on Okinawa (SACO) process.  The Roadmap reflected many of the previous 
agreements from the SACO Final Report in 1996,101 such as returning Futenma air 
station and other bases to Okinawa local community.  Realignment in Okinawa was 
based more on political decisions than a military strategy, in order to induce Japanese 
public support for the strong alliance.   
The other purpose of the realignment, which has more implications for the actual 
transformation of the alliance, was to enhance the overall force capabilities of the U.S.-
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Japan alliance and increase the interoperability between the USFJ and JSDF.  According 
to the Roadmap, Camp Zama will be transformed to a joint command post for the USFJ 
in case of the military contingency in the region.  Thus, the U.S. Army command and 
control structure will be transformed and also the headquarters of the Ground SDF 
Central Readiness Force102 will be established in Camp Zama.  The relocating of Air 
SDF Air Defense Command to Yokota Air Base and establishing a bilateral joint 
operations coordination center (BJOCC) will certainly strengthen the air defense 
capability of the U.S. and Japanese forces.  In addition, the deployment of a new U.S. X-
Band radar system in Air SDF Shariki base will also enhance the U.S. and Japan’s 
cooperation on missile defense capability.  
It is clear that the core of the realignment in Japan is meant, by relocating and 
integrating the U.S. and Japanese forces, to increase the interoperability of the two forces 
as well as their overall military capabilities, thus to build more efficient joint forces in 
case of regional security contingencies or any other security purposes around the world.  
There is an obvious reason that changing force structure to more agile and flexible under 
the strategic flexibility policy, is not emphasized in Japan’s realignment process.  It is 
because the basic force structure of USFJ is, unlikely to USFK which are mostly Army, 
comprised of mostly Marine expeditionary forces (the 3MEF in Okinawa) and also Air 
Force and Navy, which has more maneuvering capabilities than Army.103 Therefore, to 
perform a regional role, the USFJ does not require an additional transformation for its 
force structure as does in the USFK.   
A thorough examination of both the USFK and USFJ transformation clearly 
shows the different emphasis.  In Japan, the realignment has been used to emphasize the 
interoperability and integration between the USFJ and JSDF.  Moving the Air SDF Air 
Defense Command into the U.S. Yokota air base and creating a new Ground SDF Central 
Readiness Force Command in Camp Zama are good examples.  In South Korea, there 
will be less actual increase in interoperability or coordination between the USFK and 
ROK forces through the realignment.  In fact, in South Korea, through the troop 
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reduction, ten major missions and also wartime OPCON transfer, the transformation of 
USFK rather emphasizes the “Koreanization of South Korean Defense.”  On the other 
hand, through relocation and changing force structure, the transformation will increase 
the mobility and efficiency of the USFK as a future regional force.  Both the 
Koreanization of South Korean Defense and a mobile and efficient USFK will eventually 
contribute to the enhancement of the USFK’s strategic flexibility.  
From the U.S. perspective, together with USFK’s regional role, increasing the 
overall force capabilities and interoperability of USFJ and JSDF will eventually increase 
the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in the region.  Therefore, the realignment of USFJ 
also has significant influence on the U.S. strategic flexibility policy toward South Korea.  
Moreover, when the two U.S. forces actually begin to perform regional missions together, 
after the completion of realignments, the interoperability between the USFK and USFJ 
will be greatly emphasized and developed.  Some factors in the current realignments such 
as increasing USFK’s PAC-3 missile deployments in Osan and Kunsan, emphasizing the 
importance of the Navy and Air Force in South Korea, and transforming the U.S. Army 
command and control structure to a joint command post in Zama Japan in case of 
regional contingencies, will clearly contribute to the future enhancement in the 
interoperability between the USFK and USFJ.  
C. JAPAN’S REACTION TO THE TRANSFORMATION   
Before examining Japan’s policy reaction to the U.S.-Japan alliance 
transformation, it is necessary to go over Japan’s domestic responses regarding the 
realignment of USFJ compared to South Korea.  Some similarities can be found between 
both countries’ domestic debates against proposed changes in U.S. force structure.  
During the negotiations on realignment, the United States and Japan had profound 
difficulties reaching agreements on base relocation issues.  As 70% of the U.S. bases in 
Japan are concentrated in Okinawa, local communities in Okinawa were strongly 
opposed to relocating bases but also to building new facilities for USFJ within their 
communities.  Relocation of the Futenma Air Base is the best example.104  Moreover, 
regarding the issue of sharing the base relocation costs, both governments were decidedly 
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confrontational, with neither offering concessions.  Although it was agreed that the U.S. 
would take 41% and Japan 59% although initially the U.S. requested that Japan take 75%, 
still many Japanese strongly criticized their government for accepting too much of the 
burden.105  Similarly, the South Korean government met strong opposition from local 
communities in Pyungtaek area when it tried to expand Camp Humphreys in order to 
relocate Yongsan garrison and other U.S. bases from Seoul.  The government also 
received heavy criticism from its people when it made the decision to pay all expenses 
for relocating the Yongsan base to the Osan-Pyungtaek area.  Therefore, both countries 
went through similar domestic debates regarding base relocation and burden sharing 
issues.  
Moreover, it is imperative to add here that there are also crucial parallels between 
Japan and South Korea regarding the fear of entrapment in U.S. conflicts in the region.  
The fear of “abandonment” and also the “entrapment” potential in their alliance 
relationship with the United States has a long history – since the inception of the U.S.-
ROK and U.S.-Japan alliances in the 1950s.106  Within the recent realignment process in 
Japan it is hard to find the serious domestic discussions that prevail in South Korea 
regarding the fear of “entrapment” in a potential U.S.-China Taiwan Strait conflict.107  
However, while South Korea was largely dominated by the fear of U.S. abandonment 
throughout its alliance with the United States, Japan constantly experienced both 
abandonment and entrapment within the U.S.-Japan alliance.  Although Japan is 
expanding its security roles through enhancing the U.S.-Japan alliance, considering 
Japan’s WWII legacy and its pacifism in general, the Japanese public’s foremost priority 
remains avoiding war.  Within Japan’s security interests, avoiding war entrapment is as 
important as avoiding U.S. abandonment.108 
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USAWC Strategic Studies Institute (January 2004): 36. 
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Accordingly, taking these similarities in both countries’ domestic responses and 
entrapment fear into account, Japan’s policy reactions toward the U.S. military 
transformation as well as the overall alliance transformation have great implications for 
South Korea.  They offer valuable insights for South Korean policy options toward the 
U.S. strategic flexibility policy in terms of strengthening the security relationship with the 
United States.  Three important Japanese policy reactions relevant to South Korea’s 
situation are examined.  
First of all, it is important to note that Japan adequately and effectively developed 
its own security policies in response to the changes in U.S. security policy.  Moreover, 
not only the continuation but also enhancing the U.S.-Japan alliance was always one of 
the top priorities in Japan’s policies toward the United States.  In the mid-1990s, the U.S. 
EASR I and Japan NDPO respectively contributed to recover and enhance the drifting 
U.S.-Japan alliance.  Since the September 11 attack, as the U.S. GPR brought about a 
transformation to the U.S. military presence in East Asia, Japan’s new National Defense 
Program Guideline (NDPG)109 was announced in 2004.  Japan’s new NDPG supported 
the broad theme of the U.S. GPR by strengthening the alliance and increasing its defense 
capabilities.110 NDPG clearly defined global and regional threats in the new security 
environment surrounding Japan.  It recognized proliferation of WMD and ballistic 
missiles, and international terrorist activities as the main global threats.  Regional threats 
are from the unpredictability and uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan 
Strait in the light of North Korea’s developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, as 
well as China’s military modernization.  Against the global threat, NDPG emphasized the 
role of the United States as the superpower fostering international cooperation, and 
against regional threats it emphasized the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance.111 Through the 
                                                 
109 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2005 and After 
(Tokyo, 2004). Similar to Higuchi Report, there was the Araki Report, Japan’s Vision for Future Security 
and Defense Capabilities (Tokyo, 2004) prior to the NDPG. It recommended a new defense and security 
strategy for Japan to adapt to the post-September 11 and the 21st century threats and challenges. 
110 U.S.-Japan SCC Joint Statement. February 19, 2005. “The Ministers expressed their support and 
appreciation for each other's efforts to develop their respective security and defense policies. Japan's new 
National Defense Program Guidelines.” 
111 Japan’s NDPG 2004, “Close cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based 
on the Japan-US security arrangements, continues to play a key role for the security of Japan as well as 
peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.”  
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2004 NDPG, just like the 1994 NDPO which implicated Japan’s inclination toward the 
United States, Japan once again emphasized the importance of the alliance by 
recognizing the U.S. as a global security partner in the new century.   
Secondly, by active participation and with close coordination, Japan was able to 
establish not just an agreement on the USFJ realignment, but a step by step alliance 
transformation process with the United States.  The Joint Statement in February 2005 
suggested broader visions and clear goals for the alliance by establishing strategic 
objectives on regional and global levels. Then, under the strategic objectives, the roles, 
missions and capabilities of the alliance were redefined through the Midterm Report 
document in October 2005.  In order to achieve the new roles, missions, and capabilities, 
the interoperability factor between the two forces was highlighted within the defense 
cooperation of the alliance.  And finally, the details of implementing the realignment, 
first reducing the burden in Okinawa and then upgrading the force structure, were agreed 
upon by the Roadmap in May 2006.  Basically, both countries agreed upon the principles 
of the transformation and based on those principles, the details of the implementation 
process followed.   
Compare to the U.S.-Japan alliance transformation process, the U.S.-ROK 
alliance transformation process was more one-sided and also ad-hoc.  There was no 
corresponding defense policy in South Korea to Japan’s NDPG when the U.S. GPR was 
announced.  Even though the U.S.-ROK FOTA talks (2003-2004) were on process, the 
U.S. arbitrarily decided to withdraw a part of the USFK to redeploy in Iraq in 2004.  The 
FOTA talks mainly discussed issues regarding the details of USFK’s realignment and 
never covered the common objectives or roles and missions of the changing alliance.  
The core concept of the transformation, “strategic flexibility” was agreed upon in 2006, 
two years after the realignment agreement through the FOTA. 
Lastly, it is important to understand that the revitalization and enhancement in the 
U.S.-Japan alliance was only feasible because of Japan’s endless efforts to maintain 
common national interests within the alliance.  A healthy alliance is not solely based on 
common threat perceptions: it is rather based on broad areas of common national  
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interests.  In this regard, the most important features in the success of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance came from sharing and developing their common national interests and values in 
the new security environment.   
Since the mid-1990s the U.S. and Japan successfully expanded the alliance to a 
more regional and to more global alliance based on their needs and common interests.  
Through the Defense Guidelines in 1997, Japan was able to strengthen bilateral security 
cooperation with the United States and also expand its security influence to the region.  
After September 11, by Japan’s active participation in U.S. security interests, the alliance 
enhanced security cooperation and coordination beyond the region (Far East), to the 
Middle East and the Indian Ocean.  Japan’s efforts to share common security interests 
with the United States, by supporting U.S. roles in international issues, made this 
expansion of the alliance possible.  Japan was aware of the U.S. need for international 
support on its global war on terror.  Moreover, Japan also could achieve recognition from 
the international community through active participation in international affairs.  In this 
context, the U.S. recognized Japan as its “global partner” and both the United States and 
Japan moved toward transforming the alliance into a global alliance.112 
Therefore, even though the transformation of the alliance was initiated by the U.S. 
military transformation, Japan successfully was able to insert its national security 
interests into the alliance transformation.  By contrast, despite the significance of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance for South Korea’s security (in matters of imminent security, South 
Korea has more reason than Japan to pursue an alliance relationship with the U.S.), South 
Korea failed to incorporate its national interests into the alliance transformation.  
Considering the current direction of the transformation, in the near future the U.S.-Japan 
alliance will transform itself into a more effective and advanced global alliance.  By 
contrast, the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance is full of uncertainty. 
In sum, Japan’s overall reaction to the U.S. security policy change clearly shows 
Japan’s efforts to actively interact with the United States by maintaining close 
cooperation and coordination.  Also, by sharing common security interests with the 
United States, Japan develops its own security policy in ways intended to correlate with  
                                                 
112 During testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Sub-committee on Asia 
and the Pacific in May 26, 2005, Christopher R. Hill called Japan a “global partner.”  
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U.S. policy.  Through the transformation process Japan was able to strengthen its security 
relationship with the United States in concrete ways while at the same time increasing the 
overall force capabilities of the JSDF.   
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH KOREA 
Through the overview of the U.S.-Japan alliance transformation and the reaction 
from Japan, some vital implications for South Korea can be examined in terms of its 
security interests, the alliance relationship with the United States, and also its regional 
relationships.  As the consequence of the transformation, the U.S.-Japan alliance will 
expand the role of the alliance; increase the JSDF’s overall force capabilities; and 
strengthen the U.S.-Japan security relationship.  These three factors will have great 
relevance for South Korea, especially facing the U.S. strategic flexibility policy. 
The most significant implication of the U.S.-Japan alliance transformation for 
South Korea is this: as the U.S.-Japan alliance is successfully changing its structure to a 
regional and global security alliance, South Korea will be under strong pressure from the 
United States to develop the U.S.-ROK alliance in the same direction.  Moreover, as the 
U.S. forces’ realignments in both countries develop, it is possible that the linkage 
between the USFJ and USFK could be intensified in order to carry out each one’s 
regional role more effectively.  In this sense, the development of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
transformation will further promote the U.S. strategic flexibility policy toward South 
Korea. 
Considering the current situation in South Korea, as the hostile North Korea still 
remains as the primary threat to the alliance, the United States will not try to officially 
change the U.S.-ROK alliance to a regional alliance in the near term.  It is clear, however, 
that the U.S. strategic flexibility policy is gradually paving the way for the U.S.-ROK to 
change into the regional security alliance.  In order to strengthen the alliance relationship 
with the United States, South Korea might follow the direction of Japan and enlarge the 
role of the alliance.  As a result, the U.S.-ROK alliance would be strengthened, and 
therefore the ROK-Japan security relationship would be much closer.  In this context, not 
only the USFK and USFJ but possibly the ROK forces and JSDF could together perform 
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a regional role based on a strong U.S.-ROK-Japan security relationship.113  Nevertheless, 
unlike Japan, South Korea must consider how this development could influence its 
relationship with North Korea as well as China. Moreover, China is also perceived 
differently within the two alliances.114  Japan evaluated China’s military modernization 
as a threat and determined to be with the U.S. in its foreign policy toward China.    
It is also important to note that through the alliance transformation, Japan is trying 
to increase its own military capabilities.  Unlike the USFK realignment in South Korea, 
which only discusses the changes in USFK -not ROK forces-, the USFJ realignment 
includes the changes in JSDF as well.  Through the actual realignment of the USFJ and 
JDSF, it is certain that JSDF’s overall military capability, particularly missile defense and 
joint operation capabilities, will be enhanced.  As mentioned before, one of the primary 
objectives in the NDPG 2004 was to increase Japan’s own defense capabilities.  In this 
regard, the Midterm document clearly indicated that promoting not only the U.S. GPR 
but also Japan’s NDPG is one of the key missions in the U.S.-Japan alliance 
transformation.   
Japan’s efforts to increase its military capabilities are certainly not welcomed in 
the region, especially by China and North Korea, but from South Korea’s perspective as 
well.  Mainly due to the animosities and distrusts from historical colonial legacies in the 
region, many Koreans as well as Chinese perceive Japan’s increasing military capabilities 
as a sign of the revival of military nationalism.  Considering these regional perceptions 
on Japan’s increasing military capabilities, there are possibilities that developing Japan’s 
military capabilities through the U.S.-Japan alliance transformation could initiate an arms 
race in the region.  This will negatively influence the security situation on the Korean 
peninsula as well as in the region.   
It is a clear consequence that the U.S.-Japan alliance transformation will enhance 
Japan’s security relationship with the United States.  In this context, South Korea has 
mixed feelings on the strengthened security relationship between the United States and 
                                                 
113 Victor D. Cha, “Values after Victory: The Future of U.S.-Japan-Korean Relations,” CSIS Pacnet 
30, August 2, 2002.  
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Observer 36, no. 3 (2005): 453.  
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Japan.  On the one hand, a strong U.S.-Japan alliance could bring about regional stability 
under U.S. influence, and could also confirm strong support to South Korea in case of 
contingencies on the peninsula.  On the other hand, however, many South Koreans are 
anxious that the U.S.-ROK alliance is becoming less important to the United States as its 
relationship with Japan is growing stronger.  South Koreans feel strong competition from 
Japan as one of the two U.S. security allies in Northeast Asia.115  Under the current 
development of South Korea and Japan’s imbalanced relationship with the United States, 
as for South Korea the U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan alliance is easily perceived as a zero-
sum relationship. Therefore, in the midst of the current delicate relationship between the 
United States and South Korea caused by the U.S. strategic flexibility policy, the 
strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance could put more pressure on South Korea, in 
terms of its security relationship with the United States.  South Korea’s worst scenario in 
the security relationship with the United States would be the U.S.-ROK alliance 
becoming subordinate to the U.S.-Japan alliance. This explains South Korea’s negative 
reaction to strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance.  
Besides, for South Korea, it would be unwise to neglect the regional implications 
of the U.S.-Japan alliance transformation in terms of expanding and strengthening its 
alliance role, and increasing the capabilities of JSDF.  Realistically, China perceives the 
U.S.-Japan security enhancement in light of checking its own expansion in the region: 
thus China will be reluctant to see the U.S.-ROK alliance following the same 
direction.116  As many elements of the USFJ’s realignment directly or indirectly target 
North Korea, North Korea is also heavily condemning the strengthening of the U.S.-
Japan security relationship.  Considering the current security environment surrounding 
the peninsula, South Korea could not simply disregard these negative responses from 
China and North Korea.  From South Korea’s perspective, the inter-Korean 
reconciliation, China’s leverage on North Korea, and also the growing Chinese economic 
relationship with South Korea are no less important to the U.S.-ROK alliance.   
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In conclusion, although the U.S.-Japan alliance transformation provides a good 
example of strengthening the security relationship with the United States, it is hard to 
deny that it also contains negative implications for South Korea regarding its relationship 
with other regional actors.  More pressure on South Korea is expected in terms of 
expanding the alliance role and also maintaining balance with the U.S.-Japan alliance.  It 
has significant impacts on inter-Korean relations and also South Korea’s relationship 
with China and Japan.  Overall, in many ways the U.S.-Japan alliance transformation will 
underscore U.S. strategic flexibility toward South Korea.  More specifics regarding these 
implications of the U.S.-Japan alliance transformation will be discussed in the next two 
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IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY 
FOR SOUTH KOREAN SECURITY 
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the implications of U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy for South Korean security and discover the gaps between the United 
States and South Korea regarding this issue.  This process will give better understanding 
for South Korea’s policy options toward the U.S. strategic flexibility policy, which is 
addressed in the next chapter.  This chapter will primarily focus on the aspects of the U.S. 
strategic flexibility policy that could cause critical consequences to South Korean 
security.  However, before going into the actual implications of U.S. strategic flexibility 
policy for South Korean security, it is necessary to go over the regional actors’ 
perspectives on the U.S. strategic flexibility policy.  As mentioned before, the U.S. 
strategic flexibility policy would not only transform the U.S.-ROK alliance but also could 
profoundly change the regional security environment.  In this respect, China’s, Japan’s, 
and North Korea’s views on U.S. strategic flexibility are examined.   
In order to analyze the implications of the strategic flexibility for South Korean 
security, four critical aspects of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy toward South Korea, 
are assessed.  The first aspect is the implications of USFK being a regional force, since 
the previous chapters demonstrated that the agreement on strategic flexibility will 
transform the USFK into a regional force.  Indeed, through the realignment process, the 
USFK is currently changing its force structure to a rapidly deployable force in case of a 
regional contingency.  Changing the role of the USFK will change the characteristics of 
the U.S.-ROK alliance.  Eventually, when the inter-Korean reconciliation proceeds and 
the North Korean threat is significantly reduced, the regional U.S.-ROK alliance may 
request more of ROK forces’ participation in regional affairs together with the USFK.  
Secondly, the USFK deterrence capability toward North Korea will be assessed.  Many 
South Koreans fear that through the realignment process, by reducing U.S. troops to 
25,000 and relocating U.S. bases near the DMZ to further south of the Han River, the 
U.S. deterrence capabilities toward North Korea will be severely weakened.  However, 
this chapter’s analysis shows that U.S. deterrence capabilities seem to be less affected by 
the strategic flexibility of USFK.  The third aspect of strategic flexibility will be the 
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China factor.  It is the most debated issue in South Korea regarding the strategic 
flexibility of USFK.  Does the U.S. strategic flexibility policy mainly intended to contain 
China in the region?  Will USFK strategic flexibility cause South Korea’s unintended 
involvement in potential military conflicts in the Taiwan Strait between the U.S. and 
China?  Overall, it is hard to deny the increasing possibilities with regard to both these 
issues, yet it is the alliance itself rather than strategic flexibility that would cause South 
Korea’s entanglement to the potential Taiwan Strait conflict.  The final aspect to be 
examined is the possibility of an arms race in the region caused by the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy.  Northeast Asia is already the most heavily armed region in the world.  
It is conceivable that the strategic flexibility of the USFK could bring about a potential 
arms race among the major powers in the region, mainly between China and Japan, which 
could consequently cause high military tensions and instabilities in the region.   
After examining these four aspects of U.S. strategic flexibility, the latter part of 
the chapter centers on the gaps between the United States and South Korea regarding the 
issue of strategic flexibility.  There are apparently different views between the two 
countries about the regional role of the USFK.  Under the U.S. Military Transformation 
and Global Defense Posture Review (GPR), the United States is changing USFK into an 
agile and flexible expeditionary force.  However, currently South Korea is reluctant to 
accept USFK being used as a regional force as well as the alliance becoming a regional 
alliance similar to the U.S.-Japan alliance.  Then what caused this difference between two 
old allies?  It is argued in this chapter that this perception gap between the United States 
and South Korea fundamentally stems from two factors.  The first factor is each others 
rather different perceptions of and policies toward major actors in the region, such as 
North Korea, Japan and China.  The second factor is their different ideas about the 
rationale for and the vision of the alliance.  Those two factors are discussed as the 
primary reasons for the diverging perceptions on strategic flexibility.  
A. PERSPECTIVES OF THE REGIONAL ACTORS 
In order to analyze the implications of the strategic flexibility policy, it is 
important to understand the perceptions of the major players in the region on the U.S. 
strategic flexibility policy toward the Korean peninsula.  Among the regional actors, 
China, North Korea, and Japan’s perspectives are crucial.  
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1. China 
China’s perceptions of the USFK’s changing roles are the most significant factor 
for the future security environment surrounding the peninsula, considering the 
characteristics of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy.  Historically, China has compelling 
strategic interests in maximizing its influence over the Korean peninsula.  Nevertheless, 
since the beginning of the 1970s when China reconciled its relationship with the United 
States until now, China has perceived the U.S.-ROK alliance as the status quo on the 
peninsula.  There was no official announcement from Beijing regarding the issue of the 
strategic flexibility of USFK.117  However, China is certainly keeping an eye on the 
realignments of the U.S. forces in Korea and Japan, and how those realignments will 
influence the Taiwan issue.  Lately, China has criticized the U.S.-Japan alliance on their 
contingency plans to intervene in the Taiwan Strait.118   
For now, the argument on strategic flexibility and its implications has not 
developed as fully in China as it has in South Korea.  China does not perceive the 
realignment of the USFK as primarily containing itself.119  In the near future, however, it 
is likely that China would seek to block U.S.-led initiatives that could undermine China’s 
security as well as reduce its influence on the peninsula.  According to some policy 
specialists in Beijing and Shanghai, Chinese leaders are worried about the potential 
USFK relocation to the Pyongtaek area, near the ROK Navy 2nd Fleet Command on the 
Yellow Sea just across from Qingdao, which is home to the Chinese headquarters of the 
North Sea Fleet and a major naval base. 120  Although China does not recognize the 
notion of strategic flexibility as a direct threat, the creation of a large U.S. base near 
China’s major sea lane of communication seems to be a great concern to China. 
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Although China does not specifically respond to all the U.S. military 
transformation efforts in the region, during the last few decades it has been increasing its 
military spending to modernize its forces.  Recently, the United States and China 
maintained a cooperative position on the peninsula by coping with North Korea’s nuclear 
development.  However, China will likely oppose the USFK as well as USFJ’s roles and 
missions on regional security issues, especially when they become U.S.-Japan-ROK 
military cooperation applied to a Taiwan Strait contingency.   
2. North Korea 
North Korea’s reaction to the strategic flexibility of USFK is very clear.  For a 
long time North Korea insisted upon withdrawal of the USFK by arguing that the U.S.-
ROK Mutual Defense Treaty is an illegal treaty and condemned U.S. imperialism on the 
Korean peninsula.  According to North Korea’s official Rodong Sinmun, U.S. strategic 
flexibility is the U.S. imperialists’ theory for seeking domination over the Korean 
Peninsula and the rest of Asia.121  The DPRK Foreign Ministry also announced that the 
strategic flexibility policy will turn South Korea into an outpost and a logistics base 
serving the United States’ Asia strategy and it will let the United States closely 
coordinate operations of its forces in Japan and South Korea.122  
The strategic flexibility policy of USFK is perceived to cause two major changes 
for North Korean security.  First, by relocating the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division from near 
the DMZ further south, North Korea will lose its leverage on USFK.  On one hand, the 
U.S. forces deployed near the DMZ served as a “tripwire,” but on the other hand it also 
served as hostage to North Korea’s 170mm and 240mm long range artillery weapons 
heavily deployed near the DMZ to prevent a preemptive attack by the United States.123  
To North Korea, removing these U.S. forces out of its artillery range reduces its leverage 
over the United States in case of a U.S. preemptive attack.  Second, North Korea thinks 
that the relocation of the U.S. bases to the Osan-Pyungtaek area - where the Navy and Air 
                                                 
121 “Strategic Flexibility of U.S. Troops,” Rodong Sinmun, March 12, 2006. 
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Force will be more emphasized - will increase U.S. overall strike capabilities.124  North 
Korea closely watched the United States’ use of high technology missile attack capability, 
particularly the U.S. Precision Guided Missile (PGM) strike capability, in its war in Iraq.  
Since then, a U.S. preemptive missile attack on its nuclear sites has become the most 
feared scenario in North Korea.  Overall, North Korea perceives that the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy will greatly strengthen U.S. offensive potential toward North Korea by 
pulling out U.S. forces from near the DMZ and relocating them to the Osan-Pyungtaek 
area.125  
3. Japan 
The Korean peninsula has been a long-standing interest for Japan’s security, 
particularly in terms of its geographic proximity to Japan’s home islands.  It has been 
described as both a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan and a land-bridge to continental 
Asia.  Japan’s security policies, including the U.S.-Japan alliance, have been largely 
influenced by security changes in Korea.126  
As discussed in Chapter III, Japan has no reason to object to the strategic 
flexibility of USFK.  Japan has been seeking to expand its roles and realms of security as 
well as to enlarge its influence in the region through the U.S.-Japan alliance.  It is 
expected that through the realignment based on strategic flexibility, the USFK’s role will 
become more similar to USFJ by carrying out regional missions.  Japan and the United 
States have very similar perceptions of North Korea and China, and have already agreed 
on the extended role of USFJ in the region.127 Japan has growing apprehension that 
China’s broader regional ambitions may not be compatible with its own vision for 
Northeast Asia.  Moreover, North Korea’s nuclear weapons and long range missile  
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development is the greatest security threat to Japan.  The United States and Japan are 
building a missile defense system through the realignment of USFJ, and it is recognized 
by Japan that the realignment of USFK will also contribute to the missile defense.  
Moreover, maintaining a strong U.S.-ROK alliance serves Japan’s primary 
security interests.  First, although Japan perceives North Korea as an imminent military 
threat, Japan is reluctant to become involved in a potential war on the Korean peninsula.  
Japan would not prefer a withering of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which would shift more 
burden to Japan in case of a war in the peninsula.  Therefore, the U.S.-ROK alliance 
remains important to Japan for maintaining stability in the Korean peninsula.  Second, 
Japan does not want to remain the United States’ only ally in case of a breakdown of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance.128  There could be an increased domestic pressure upon Japanese 
government if it remains the only country in Asia maintaining a U.S. military presence on 
its soil.  For example, if incidents like the Okinawa rape incident happen again, the 
Japanese people would question why they have to keep U.S. bases on their small 
country’s territory, when no other countries in Asia do so.  Therefore, as long as Japan 
wants to maintain a strong security relationship with the United States, it seems that 
Japan will also strongly support the U.S.-ROK alliance and its transformation as well.  
In conclusion, each actor’s different perceptions are significant to South Korea in 
analyzing the implications of strategic flexibility for its security.  China’s negative 
attitude toward U.S. strategic flexibility is important regarding South Korea’s concern for 
its involvement in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict.  China’s and Japan’s rather different 
perceptions on this issue support the argument that strategic flexibility could increase the 
possibility of an arms race in the region.  Lastly, North Korea’s strong opposition to 
strategic flexibility stemming from its concerns on relocating U.S. bases and increasing 
strike capabilities reflects that USFK’s North Korean deterrence is still performing its 
function. 
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B. STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY AND SOUTH KOREAN SECURITY: FOUR 
CRITICAL ASPECTS 
This section discusses the four critical aspects of U.S. strategic flexibility in South 
Korean security.  These aspects have been the most debated issues in South Korea since 
the agreement on strategic flexibility in January 2006.  Although they are distinguished 
for the purpose of analysis, all four aspects are closely related to each other and together 
will crucially influence South Korean security as well as the U.S.-ROK alliance.  Based 
on these analyses – how strategic flexibility will influence South Korea’s security – South 
Korea’s policy options toward the U.S. strategic flexibility policy are examined in the 
next chapter.   
1. U.S.-ROK Regional Security Alliance  
In general, a large portion of the public and also many scholars in South Korea 
view the increasing USFK strategic flexibility policy as an automatic expansion of 
USFK’s roles and missions in the region.  Accordingly, the USFK will no longer just stay 
in the peninsula to deter North Korea but will freely be deployed to other places in the 
region and even outside of the region to serve U.S. security interests.129  
As examined in Chapter II, the U.S. strategic flexibility policy is based on the 
U.S. global military strategy to utilize U.S. forces overseas more flexibly and efficiently.  
Indeed, the concept of strategic flexibility emphasizes enhancing the efficiency of U.S. 
forces operating overseas.  Especially considering some of the USFK’s unchanged force 
structure and base locations since the end of the Korean War, it is apparent that the USFK 
realignment pursues efficiency.130  However, it is hard to deny that seeking efficiency 
through building a new force structure in Korea – for  example, relocating bases from 
congested commercial areas with small training spaces to areas with greater mobility and 
better training conditions – will eventually contribute to a regionally flexible force rather 
than a static force on the peninsula.  In this context, transforming the U.S. force structure 
in Korea has more implications than just changing USFK to a regional force.  
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Transformation will not only expand the role of USFK but also expand the role of the 
alliance itself.  By emphasizing the importance of enhancing the alliance relationship, the 
U.S. military transformation contains the idea of the alliance transformation.131 Through 
this transformation the U.S.-ROK alliance is likely to be transformed into a regional 
alliance possibly modeled on the U.S.-Japan alliance.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has fostered Japan’s extended 
military role in the region.  By gradually expanding the USFK’s mission area, the United 
States will encourage the U.S.-ROK alliance to follow a path similar to the U.S.-Japan 
alliance.  Moreover, there are close interrelations between the current U.S. transformation 
efforts in both South Korea and Japan.  From the basic planning level the realignment of 
USFK and USFJ are linked together based on the broad U.S. regional security strategy.  
When the realignments are completed, it is possible that all the U.S. forces in the region 
will be integrated under a U.S. Northeast Asia or Asia Pacific Command 
Headquarters. 132  In this context, it is possible that the United States will further 
emphasize the trilateral security cooperation between the three countries in order to 
enhance the interoperability of the USFK and USFJ.  
Eventually, the regional U.S.-ROK alliance will demand an extended role for the 
ROK forces, as happened in Japan’s case.133  Through the USFK realignment, the ROK 
forces will take the leading role in the defense of South Korea while the USFK will 
remain only in a supporting role for the defense of South Korea in the peninsula.134  Then 
the USFK will primarily focus on U.S. regional interests and will be prepared for 
conflicts outside the peninsula.  Furthermore, if the tensions in the peninsula reduce as 
inter-Korean reconciliation develops, the United States could require the U.S.-ROK 
alliance to be able to expand in scope to include regional missions beyond the Korean 
peninsula.135  In this case, it is possible to conceive that the ROK forces could be asked 
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to support the USFK’s regional military actions in the name of regional stability.  Even 
now, ROK forces are already deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq supporting the U.S. 
troops partially under the command of the U.S. PACOM.136 In sum, there are high 
possibilities that the strategic flexibility changes to USFK could transform the U.S.-ROK 
alliance into a regional alliance, and the ROK forces together with the USFK could be 
mobilized as a regional force under this future regional alliance.  
2. Will Strategic Flexibility Weaken North Korean Deterrence? 
One of the most debated issues regarding the strategic flexibility policy is the 
United States’ deterrence capability toward North Korea.  Many South Koreans are 
concerned that the strategic flexibility policy and the overall realignment of the USFK 
could eventually weaken its deterrence capabilities toward North Korea.  However, it 
seems that there are more psychological perceptions than actual reduction of deterrence 
capabilities in those concerns.  
There are good reasons for South Koreans to perceive that the USFK will have a 
diminished deterrence capability toward North Korea.  Firstly, by implementing strategic 
flexibility it is apparent that the USFK’s primary role will be changed from deterring 
North Korea to a regional purpose.  Second, the USFK troops will be reduced to 25,000.  
Approximately a third of the total troops before the withdrawal, 12,500, will leave South 
Korea by the end of 2008.  This withdrawal, initiated by redeploying the 2nd Infantry 
Division 2nd Regiment from Korea to Iraq and later to the U.S. homeland in 2004, is the 
largest troop reduction since the 1971 withdrawal of the 7th Division’s 20,000 troops 
based on the Nixon Doctrine.  Last, through the realignment, the 2nd Infantry Division 
deployed near the DMZ and serving as a “tripwire” since the end of the Korean War will 
be fully relocated to south of the Han River in the Osan-Pyungtaek area.  By abandoning 
the role of “tripwire,” which lasted for fifty years, it is largely believed in South Korea 
that the United States is disengaging from its defense commitment to South Korea.137  
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However, it is naïve to conceive that reduction in the troop numbers will 
automatically weaken the overall capabilities of the force.  If the number is that 
important, one can say that 12,500 U.S. troops is only one percent of the 1.2 million 
North Korean military.  Depending on the numbers, whether it is 25,000 or 37,500 does 
not make a crucial difference in countering North Korea’s one million strong military 
force.  The USFK’s deterrence toward North Korea mainly comes from its total presence 
and from the U.S. defense commitment, and less from actual troop numbers.  When the 
Second Brigade of the Second Infantry Division, about 3,600 troops, dispatched to Iraq in 
2004, many South Koreans worried that the move would seriously weaken the North 
Korean deterrence.  However, it is difficult to prove that since then the USFK’s North 
Korean deterrence capability has been weakened because 3,600 USFK troops left South 
Korea.  Moreover, it is important to note that USFK’s overall firepower seems to be 
unchanged.  Although the ground force structure will be changed from a Division to a 
Brigade-level Unit of Action (UA), it is known that this UA will maintain the fire 
capability of the previous Division level.  In order to counter North Korea’s conventional 
forces, M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2A2 Bradley fighting vehicles will be still the main 
assets of the UA.  Although the number of Apache helicopters will be reduced from 70 to 
40, the older type AH-64 will be replaced with the more advanced AH-64D Apache 
Longbow Helicopters.  Most of all, current USFK’s counter-firing assets such as MLRS 
(Multiple Launch Rocket System) and counter-battery radars were excluded from 
withdrawal due to their importance for deterring North Korea.138  
U.S. officials disagree with the South Korean perception that the deterrence 
capability  toward North Korea will be reduced.  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
and other high officials in the U.S. DOD repeatedly stressed regarding the GPR, “focus 
on capabilities, not numbers.”139  They confirmed that the U.S. deterrence capability 
toward North Korea will not be diminished by merely reducing troops in South Korea.  
One of their demonstrations of support for deterrence capability is the U.S. decision to 
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invest $11 billion to upgrade the capabilities of USFK during 2003-2006.140 Although 
many South Koreans doubt the actual purpose and use of the U.S. $11 billion investment 
in the USFK, it is hard to deny that it will increase overall capabilities of the USFK.141  
Also, it is not convincing that abandoning the concept of a “tripwire” will 
decrease the U.S. defense commitment or automatically reduce its deterrence capability 
toward North Korea.  Conversely, by relocating the bases to the rear of the DMZ and thus 
minimizing the potential loss from North Korean artillery and short range missiles 
heavily deployed near the DMZ, the survivability of USFK will be greatly increased.  
Moreover, relocating bases to the Osan-Pyungtaek area will also enhance the counter-
strike capability of USFK in case of the North’s attack.  It is evident that the next war in 
the peninsula will not be the same as the Korean War in 1950.  Primarily, the USFK 
would not confront the North Korean army by forming long battle lines; rather, it will 
take strategic advantages based on its advanced force mobility and intelligence capability.  
This operational concept will require a network-centric expeditionary force with highly 
capable projection power from fighters and ships.  In this context, the Osan-Pyungtaek 
area, which is nearby Osan Air Base, and the ROK 2nd Fleet in Pyungtaek harbor are 
perfect locations to carry out joint operations by a network-centric expeditionary force.142  
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by a greater reliance on lighter, more agile ground forces and advanced naval and air 
assets, as opposed to the comparatively static, heavy, and single-focused American 
ground force units traditionally deployed along the DMZ.143   
Most importantly, South Korea must understand that abandoning the tripwire 
concept did not come from the idea to reduce the USFK’s North Korean deterrence 
capability; rather, it came from transforming the obsolete force structure into a more 
efficient and capable one.  Since the end of the Cold War, the tripwire concept and 
forward positioning of U.S. forces near the DMZ has been largely viewed as 
technologically and strategically obsolete to the U.S. military planners.  They view 
USFK’s current configuration as an inefficient use of manpower and resources, especially 
since their deterrence and war-fighting capability are based on an “unbalanced capital-to-
labor ratio” that did not adequately reflect advances in high-tech warfare.144  Moreover, 
one cannot say that the United States would not respond to a North Korean reinvasion of 
the South and abandon South Korea because there are no more U.S. “tripwire” forces 
near the DMZ.  In this case, what will happen to over 70,000 American civilians 
currently staying in Seoul if North Korea suddenly attacks the South?  Abandoning a 
“tripwire” does not mean abandoning its ally and its defense commitment.  As long as the 
U.S.-ROK alliance robustly remains based on the Mutual Security Treaty and the USFK 
stays, South Korea should not be excessively concerned about actual U.S. support in case 
of a war in Korea.145  
In sum, the realignment of USFK will not reduce its actual deterrence capabilities 
toward North Korea.  Instead, some elements of the realignment could contribute to the 
deterrence capabilities in terms of increasing the efficiency of the USFK’s overall force 
capability.  The criticism is rather based on South Koreans’ psychological anxieties 
stemming from troop reduction and relocating forward troops to the rear by abandoning 
the “tripwire,” which was a long time symbol of the U.S. strong defense commitment to 
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South Korea.146 However, as the role of the USFK gradually changes to a regional 
purpose rather than North Korean deterrence, it is evident that the ROK forces should 
exert more effort and invest in more military resources to effectively deter the continuous 
military aggression from North Korea. 
3. Involvement in a Potential U.S.-China Conflict in the Taiwan Strait  
The core of the strategic flexibility debates in South Korea comes from its 
increasing security concerns that the USFK’s regional deployment might bring about its 
unintended involvement in a regional conflict such as a potential U.S.-China military 
conflict in the Taiwan Strait.  In spite of the Joint Statement article that, “the U.S. 
respects the ROK position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast 
Asia against the will of the Korean people,”147 which is indeed very ambiguous, the fear 
of “entrapment”148 is prevailing in South Korean society.  To address this conclusion, it 
is true that strategic flexibility could bring about South Korea’s unintended involvement 
to regional conflicts; however, more significantly it is the U.S.-ROK alliance itself, not 
the strategic flexibility alone that will cause this “entrapment.”   
There are two contending views within the debate about strategic flexibility 
bolstering involvement in regional conflicts.  On one side, many Korean scholars argue - 
and also the majority of the Korean public believes - that the primary purpose of U.S. 
strategic flexibility is to utilize the USFK in case of a conflict with China in the Taiwan 
Strait.  They believe that the USFK will certainly be mobilized in this case.149 This group 
believes that the two hubs in Pyungtaek-Osan and Daegu-Busan where the USFK will be  
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relocated could serve the role of a U.S. forward outpost and supply base to contain 
China.150 Therefore, they argue that the strategic flexibility of USFK will further enhance 
the U.S. capabilities to check China.151  
The other group rejects this idea by saying that it is unnecessary to be concerned 
about involvement in a U.S.-China conflict in the Taiwan Strait since it has such a low 
possibility considering their current relationship.  The current Chinese leaders under 
President Hu Jintao have consistently and will continue to focus on China’s economic 
development, and thus will intentionally attempt to maintain strategic cooperation with 
the United States.152  U.S. cooperation is vital to China, especially to the success of the 
2008 Beijing Olympics and 2010 Shanghai Expo.  Therefore, this group argues that a 
military conflict between the U.S. and China in the Taiwan Strait and South Korean 
involvement because of the USFK’s strategic flexibility originates from an overly 
pessimistic view of Northeast Asia’s international politics.153  
Considering the characteristics of the strategic flexibility of USFK, regardless of 
the United States’ intention, it is apparent that the U.S. capability to check China will 
increase.  As the USFK is transformed to a rapidly deployable expeditionary force and 
begins to carry out its regional role, it is hard to deny the possibilities of its deployments 
to conflict areas in the region, particularly in the Taiwan Strait.  Although in general the 
possibilities of military conflicts between the U.S. and China are low, it is also hard to 
exclude the worst case scenario such as Taiwan declaring independence due to the 
changing security environment in Northeast Asia.  In case of a military conflict in the 
Taiwan Strait, the USFJ is more likely to be deployed before the USFK, considering 
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geography and force structure.154  Nonetheless, depending on the situation, there are 
certain possibilities in which the USFK or U.S. bases in Korea could be used. 155 
Therefore, from a South Korean perspective, it is rational that the strategic flexibility of 
USFK could increase the ROK’s “entrapment” in a potential United States conflict with 
China.  
However, it is also important to consider that for the USFK, a largely Army force, 
to be put into the Taiwan Straits to support or to carry out U.S. military action means an 
almost full scale war with China. 156   Regardless of strategic flexibility, it will be 
impossible for South Korea to not become involved or remain neutral in the case of a full 
blown war between the United States and China.157  That is, even without the strategic 
flexibility policy, the United States could and will use all of its forces stationed abroad, 
including the USFK, according to its national security interests.  Moreover, South Korea 
must not forget that the U.S.-ROK alliance is based on the U.S.-ROK Mutual Security 
Treaty which indicates that the U.S. and South Korea mutually have to support each other 
in case one of the parties’ territory in the Pacific is under external attack.158   
In conclusion, there are some elements in Korean society convinced that the 
strategic flexibility could increase the risk of entrapment to South Korea.  Nonetheless, it 
will be the U.S.-ROK alliance itself that would cause entrapment in case of a U.S.-China  
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military conflict, not just the strategic flexibility policy.  As long as the alliance 
relationship with the U.S. remains, it is part of the risk that South Korea must take 
regardless of the strategic flexibility policy.  
4. Can Strategic Flexibility Cause an Arms Race? 
The strategic flexibility of the USFK has more implications than just within the 
U.S.-ROK alliance and the peninsula.  It also has a wider influence on the security 
environment in Northeast Asia.159 Structurally, Northeast Asia is the one of the most 
heavily armed regions in the world, with many strong military states confronting each 
other in close proximity, including the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait.  
Surrounded by China, Russia, and Japan, the peninsula is the geographic epicenter of 
Northeast Asia.  A little change in the military posture on the peninsula could cause 
immediate and sensitive responses within the region.  In this context, the changing role of 
the USFK from deterring North Korea to a regional purpose could cause negative impacts 
by increasing the arms race in the region. 
The strategic flexibility of USFK contains a couple of factors that could cause a 
military buildup among the states in the region, especially in China and Japan but in 
others as well.  First, with its strategic flexibility the United States is viewed as focusing 
more on the Navy and Air Force rather than the Army by relocating bases to the Osan-
Pyungtaek area, which eventually could strengthen its force projection capability.160  
China and North Korea primarily but also Russia could view this U.S. enhanced 
projection capability as a potential threat.  Secondly, it is also clear that the USFK, as 
well as USFJ, will be transformed to more efficient and highly capable forces with high 
technological weapons. These developments could facilitate the mentality of military 
competition in the region and subsequently bring about an arms race among the states.161  
Lastly, the frequent in-and-out of the USFK could give the wrong signal, especially to  
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North Korea and but also to China when there is a high tension in the region.  Such 
movement could be perceived as a planned exercise or even an actual attack targeting 
them.  
Currently, the United States’ and China’s relationship is regarded as “strategic 
competitor.” In this context, China is making more efforts to counter-balance the United 
States’ increasing military pressure and as its investment in military modernization 
increases, it is likely to cause the same response from Japan to strengthen its military 
capabilities.  In these circumstances, based on the three factors discussed above, there are 
possibilities that the U.S. strategic flexibility toward South Korea could contribute to 
developing a greater confrontational environment between the U.S.-Japan-ROK and 
China-Russia-DPRK, which some view as a “new Cold War” in Asia.162 It is obvious 
that during the last fifty years, the U.S.-ROK alliance based on the presence of the USFK 
contributed to regional stability by deterring a North Korean reinvasion of the South.  
Still, regional stability and peace is key to the U.S. forward military presence in the 
region.  However, the regionalizing of the USFK with strengthened project capability and 
its frequent comings and goings from the peninsula could certainly create a new security 
environment with a high possibility of an arms race in the region.  Therefore, the shift of 
USFK to a regional force could eventually cause permanent instability in the region, in 
contrast to the original purpose of the USFK.163  
C. GAPS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOUTH KOREA  
Fundamentally, the debates and discords around strategic flexibility policy reflect 
the weaknesses of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which have gradually developed since the end 
of the Cold War.  Many scholars and policy makers in both countries have pointed out 
various causes of the weaknesses and conflicts in the U.S.-ROK alliance.164  Recently, 
the following two factors have surfaced.  First, which is mostly discussed within the 
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alliance, is their perception gap about North Korea.  As North Korea develops its nuclear 
weapons and at the same time inter-Korean relations improve, the United States and 
South Korea have struggled to narrow their wide perception gap and diverging policies 
on North Korea.  The second factor is growing domestic anti-American sentiment in 
South Korea.  As South Korea’s economy grows and also its belief in self-reliant defense 
spreads, its asymmetrical relationship with the U.S. has become more and more 
unbearable to the people.  A few events such as referees’ unfair decision in favor of the 
United States in the 2002 Winter Olympics and the USFK training accidents killing two 
school girls in June 2002 accelerated the nationwide anti-American sentiment in South 
Korea.   
However, it seems there are more fundamental factors causing the different 
perspectives on the strategic flexibility issue than just the North Korean perception gap 
and South Korea’s anti-American sentiment.  The alliance is based on common national 
interests.  The presence of the USFK and its current transformation process thoroughly 
reflects the U.S. security policy based on its national interests.  Strategic flexibility must 
be viewed in this regard.  Accordingly, this paper discusses the following two factors as a 
main cause of both countries’ different perspectives on the strategic flexibility of USFK: 
diverging perspectives on regional actors and differences in the alliance’s rationales and 
visions.165  
1. Diverging Perspectives on Regional Actors 
The first factor that causes the perception gap within the alliance is their diverging 
perspectives on the regional actors as well as regional security outlook.166  This is beyond 
their conflicting perceptions on the North Korean nuclear issue.  Details of the USFK 
realignment based on the strategic flexibility policy are intimately related to area security 
issues surrounding North Korea, China, and Japan.  As long as both countries have 
different perspectives and different types of foreign policies toward the regional actors, it 
will be difficult to align their different ideas on strategic flexibility.  
 
                                                 
165 Won-Soo Kim, “Challenges for the U.S.-ROK Alliance in the Twenty-First Century,” in The 
Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia (Standford: Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2004), 164-166.  
166 East Asia Institute, 23.  
75 
a. North Korea 
North Korea was the fundamental rationale for the U.S.-ROK alliance.  
The U.S.-ROK alliance consistently maintained the goal of deterring North Korea’s 
reinvasion of South Korea.  Even in the post-Cold War era, the main reason that the 
alliance could maintain its Cold War structure was the existence of the common threat 
perception of North Korea.  Two major events have dramatically changed this common 
perception of the alliance.167  Initiated by Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy, the 2000 
Pyungyang Summit and other subsequent reconciliation processes 168  in the Korean 
peninsula abruptly changed South Korean perceptions of North Korea.  South Korea, 
after fifty years of fear and antagonism, began to perceive North Korea more as an object 
for future reunification through cooperation and comprehension than the main enemy.169  
By contrast, since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States defined North 
Korea as a member of the ‘axis of evil’ with two other countries in the Middle East.170  
Now North Korea is not just a military threat in the Korean peninsula and an element of 
the instability in the region, it became a potential military threat to the continental United 
States with its nuclear weapons and missile development.  Those two respective turning 
point events and subsequent developments clearly contributed to the beginning of the 
drift in the alliance.   
Most recently, after the North Korean nuclear test on October 9, 2006, 
South Korea supported the U.S.-led U.N. resolution implementing further sanctions on 
North Korea.171  However, there are still conflicting issues between the two countries 
regarding North Korea.  The U.S. wants South Korea to be an active participant in the 
U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and persuade its two key businesses, 
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Kumgang Mountain Tourism and Gaesung Industrial Complex, to stop their associations 
with the North.  South Korea’s requests to the United States are to have direct talks with 
the North and unfreezing its financial sanctions on North Korea.   
Therefore, it is certain that the United States and South Korea now have 
diverging policies toward North Korea.  While both countries share overall interests 
regarding North Korea such as the elimination of nuclear programs, reduction of the 
military threat, and improvement of human rights, currently their way to achieve these 
goals are rather different.  WMD and proliferation are most important to the United 
States while preventing another war and the eventual collapse of North Korea are the top 
priorities to South Korea.172 In the South Korean perspective, the military conflict in the 
peninsula could be initiated either by a U.S. preemptive missile strike on the North’s 
nuclear sites, or a North Korean attack fearing a United States’ preemptive strike.   
b. China 
The two allies have quite different perspectives and foreign policies 
toward China, too.  Like North Korea, China was one of the main enemies of the U.S.-
ROK alliance in the region.  The United States and ROK fought against the PLA in the 
Korean War, and since then China has been North Korea’s primary military ally.  During 
the Vietnam War, the greatest concern of the United States was China’s involvement in 
the war backing Vietnamese Communists.  It was the United States which first changed 
its posture toward China in the early 1970s by reconciling relations and recognizing 
China instead of Taiwan.  South Korea normalized its relationship with China and Russia 
in 1992 and 1993 under the “Northern Diplomacy.” 173 Since then China has become one 
of the most influential actors in the Korean peninsula.  Besides economic 
interdependence with China, there are a number of factors that South Korea could not 
neglect in its relationship with China.   
China and Korea share cultural affiliation based on geographic closeness.  
Based on this close cultural background the two countries dramatically increased their 
political, economic and also social interchanges during the last decade.  Moreover, China 
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has a vital role in South Korea’s foreign policy.  China gives more leeway to South Korea 
in terms of dealing with U.S. unilateralism.  Regarding Japan, South Korea can depend 
on China checking Japan’s extreme rightists and its revival of militarism.  Most of all, 
China has significance for South Korea’s engagement with North Korea.  China is the 
most influential country to North Korea in terms of economic aid and political support.  
China’s influence on North Korea is crucial to South Korea’s overall management of the 
North Korean issue.174   
Meanwhile, the United States perceives China differently.  China is one of 
the major trading partners to the United States and its influence on North Korea also is 
viewed importantly in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully within the six-
party talks.  Nonetheless, China is perceived as a potential rival in the region expanding 
its influence to its neighbors.  With its rapid economic growth and the size of the 
population and territory, China is considered the only country that can challenge the 
United States in the future.  In this context, the United States’ military intervention efforts 
in countries in the “arc of instability” in the name of counter-terrorism has been largely 
viewed as containing China.  Building missile defense systems with Japan, in which 
South Korea did not participate, is also considered as a part of this containment.  
c. Japan 
The U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan alliances have served successfully as the 
two main pillars maintaining U.S. influence in the region.  There had been many efforts 
from the United States to strengthen the security relationship among the three 
countries.175  For a time preceding the beginning of the second North Korean nuclear 
crisis in 2002, through the process of Trilateral Cooperation on Oversight Group 
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(TCOG), the form of trilateral alliance was discussed as the future of both alliances.176 
However, South Korea’s concern about Japan’s remilitarization based on historic 
antagonism and disbelief could not be overcome easily.  Despite South Korea’s close 
economic, political and social relationships with Japan, there are underlying differences 
between South Korea and the United States in terms of their security policies toward 
Japan.   
There are many ongoing conflicting issues between South Korea and 
Japan.  From South Korea’s perspective, the distorted history textbooks, comfort women, 
and other various problems from Japan’s harsh colonial legacy still remain unresolved.  
More recently, territorial disputes on Dokdo, and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
frequent visits to the Yaskuni Shrine became hot issues deteriorating their relationship.  
Overall, many Koreans fear Japan’s extreme rightists taking over political power, and 
remilitarizing Japan by starting to revise its Peace Constitution.   
In this context, Koreans are deeply concerned about Japan’s expanding 
role in international affairs based on the strong U.S.-Japan alliance.  There are two 
specific reasons for South Korean concerns about strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance 
other than fearing its remilitarization.  First, South Korea perceives that the increase in 
the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the United States’ Asian security policy will 
eventually bring about a decrease in the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance.  The last 
thing that South Koreans want in the relationship with the United States is the U.S.-ROK 
alliance becoming subordinated to the U.S.-Japan alliance.177  It is part of South Korea’s 
abandonment fear stemming from perceiving the two alliances as a zero-sum relationship.  
Second, there are South Koreans’ concerns about the potential regional power 
competition between Japan and China, as Japan expands its roles in the region under the 
name of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  Korea’s modern history has produced clear lessons of  
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the result of power competition surrounding the Korean peninsula.  The current South 
Korean President Roh’s “Balancer” policy clearly shows that South Korea desires not to 
suffer again by being a shrimp amongst the struggles of whales.178   
The U.S.-Japan alliance is considered a linchpin in U.S. Asian security 
policy.  The importance of Japan in U.S. interests in the region and globally is well 
explained in the previous chapter, so there is no need to reemphasize it here.  Unlike 
South Korea, Japan’s taking more responsibility by expanding its roles in international 
affairs is crucial to the United States in terms of burden sharing and also checking 
China’s expansion in the region.  Therefore, when South Korea’s perceptions of Japan as 
a source for regional instability and the United States’ perception of Japan as a critical 
partner in checking China collide, it could seriously weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
Overall it is clear that the different perceptions of North Korea, China, and 
Japan create the fundamental gaps between the two countries’ foreign policies including 
the strategic flexibility of USFK and further transformation in the alliance.  Reducing 
these perception gaps will be the most urgent task for the alliance in order to successfully 
maintain the alliance in the future.  However, this will not be an easy task.  It is evident 
that the United States and South Korea share common values in democracy and free 
market economy, and also share common national interests in regional stability and peace 
in the peninsula.  Nevertheless, as long as these different perceptions toward regional 
actors reflect each others’ security interests and priorities, it will be difficult for the two 
countries to overcome their differences.  Moreover, considering the peculiar 
circumstances surrounding the Korean peninsula – conflicting interests among powerful 
states, North and South confrontation, and South Korea’s rather asymmetrical 
relationship with the United States – it is predictable that the United States and South 
Korea  have these perception gaps.   
Therefore, as long as maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-ROK alliance 
remains key national interests for both countries, the United States and South Korea must 
make efforts to acknowledge these different perceptions and perspectives held by the 
other.  It is more beneficial for them to focus on similarities rather than differences.  
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Fortunately, the United States and ROK have maintained a good policy cooperation 
framework as well as social economic ties – the recent economic cooperation on the Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) is a good example.  In terms of security cooperation, both 
countries must develop their common interests within the strategic flexibility of USFK.  
Thus, South Korea must examine what common interests can be found within strategic 
flexibility, and the United States must recognize this common interest rather than 
highlighting negative aspects of this policy for South Korea.  Examining the common 
interests in the U.S. strategic flexibility policy will be the core of South Korea’s policy 
options, which are further discussed in the next chapter.  
2. Differences on Rationales and Visions of the Alliance  
During the Cold War era, it was clear that the primary purpose of the U.S.-ROK 
alliance was to deter the North Korean threat.  Although South Korea’s ultimate goal in 
the alliance was peace or more specifically the peaceful reunification of Korea and the 
United States’ goal was preventing the spread of Communism and maintaining regional 
stability, there was no difference between the two countries that strong deterrence of 
North Korea is the best way to achieve their respective goals.  The end of the Cold War 
and subsequent changes in the security environment in Northeast Asia brought challenges 
to this common alliance rationale.  Different perspectives toward the regional actors and 
different priorities in security policies also fostered this diverging rationale in the 
alliance.   
Even before the transformation of the USFK, it was evident that the two countries 
were seeking rather different purposes through the alliance.  Deterring North Korea from 
invading South Korea is not any longer the common alliance rationale to both countries.  
The U.S. rationale in the alliance has shifted from the peninsula to the region and to the 
globe, whereas South Korea prefers the alliance to be confined in the peninsula rather 
than expanded to the region.179 
Both countries’ divided perspectives on the North Korean nuclear issue exactly 
show this diverging alliance rationale.  South Koreans recognize that North Korea’s 
conventional weapons are more of a threat to its security than the nuclear weapons.  They 
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do not think that North Korea will use the nuclear weapons to invade the South.  For the 
United States, North Korea’s conventional weapons are not considered as much of a 
threat since South Korea’s military capabilities are recognized as much superior to the 
North’s.  Based on the global war on terror, the United States’ primary interest is to 
prevent the proliferation of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, and especially potential 
channels to terrorist organizations.  Therefore, the worst scenario case to South Korea is a 
second Korean War on the peninsula, but to the United States it is another September 11 
terrorist attack equipped with North Korea’s WMD weapons.180  
In this context, the two countries also do not share the same vision about the U.S.-
ROK alliance.  For South Korea the first priority in the alliance is and will invariably be 
the security of the peninsula by maintaining strong deterrence toward North Korea.  
Although the threat perception of the North has been weakened during the last five years, 
there have been very little improvements on military confrontation between North and 
South.181  Moreover, many Koreans think that a U.S. presence is still essential to South 
Korean security for the time being.182  From a South Korean perspective the U.S.-ROK 
alliance must guarantee its security first and foremost as long as South Korea perceives a 
threat from North Korea.  Expanding the role of the alliance to the region and also 
globally is second to deterring the North Korean threat.   
The United States has rather different ideas about the vision of the alliance.  The 
current transformation process reflects the broader roles of the alliance together with 
other alliances in the region.  In order to confront new threats, such as transnational 
terrorism, the United States seems to want to form a broad security alliance beyond 
securing the territory of South Korea.  The new alliance system, the coalition of the  
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willing nations, will take over the traditional fixed alliance in handling international 
crises.183  From the U.S. perspective, ideally the U.S.-ROK alliance will be a part of a 
regional coalition with other bilateral alliances, such as with Japan and Australia.184  
In this context, it is significant to note that the United States and South Korea 
officially agreed upon working on the Joint Study on the Vision of the ROK-U.S. Alliance 
on the Common Understanding of the Security Environment on the Korean Peninsula and 
in Northeast Asia.185  It is stated that the “Study determined that the future Alliance 
would contribute to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, in the region, and 
globally.” This will be a timely opportunity to restore the trust between the two countries 
by building common understanding and confidence, as well as narrow gaps between 
South Korea’s focus on the peninsula alone and U.S. efforts to expand to the region and 
globally.  Consequently, exploring the common interests of strategic flexibility will be 
one of the key issues in this study.   
In conclusion, the two factors discussed above, diverging perspectives on regional 
actors and differences on the alliance’s rationale and vision, seem to be the most 
fundamental and critical factors contributing to the gaps between the two countries.  
Considering these two factors, the following chapter will examine the policy options for 
South Korea.  South Korean policy options must take into account that the troubles 
regarding U.S. strategic flexibility within the two countries mainly stems from these two 
factors.  In this context, how to cope with the strategic flexibility policy and changing 
role of USFK in light of enhancing the security of South Korea and also strengthening the 
alliance will be the key points in these policy options.  
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V. SOUTH KOREA’S POLICY OPTIONS TO U.S. STRATEGIC 
FLEXIBILITY 
The previous chapters have shown how and why the U.S. strategic flexibility 
policy would change the security environment on the peninsula and also in Northeast 
Asia.  In this context, South Korea’s policy response toward the U.S. strategic flexibility 
policy will also be critical in shaping the future of the alliance as well as the security of 
South Korea.  South Korea’s policy options are evaluated in this chapter from four 
essential perspectives in its policy decision making.  They are: the future U.S.-ROK 
alliance relationship; the inter-Korean relationship - deterrence to North Korea as well as 
reconciliation toward reunification; South Korea’s self-reliant defense; and its 
relationship with regional actors, particularly with China and Japan.   
However, at the outset, three difficulties with regard to determining South 
Korea’s policy options must be noted.  The first comes from the unpredictable future of 
the security environment within and surrounding South Korea.  The Korean peninsula is 
the one of the places in the world full of uncertainties with high possibilities of a military 
conflict, which is continuously causing instability in the region.  From a conventional war 
to the collapse of the North Korean regime, and from a permanent division of North and 
South to a peaceful reunification, every thinkable scenario is possible in the future of the 
peninsula.  Moreover, the recent development of North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests 
has deepened security uncertainties in the peninsula.  Outside of the peninsula, a future 
contentious relationship between China and the United States or between China and 
Japan also could contribute to the uncertainty.  Thus, South Korean policy options must 
take into account these unpredictable external variables in its future security.  
The second difficulty comes from the internal policy dilemmas of the South 
Korean government. The South Korean government is under great criticism from its 
people for seeking both a self-reliant national defense and a strong alliance relationship 
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with the United States in the name of the “Cooperative Self-reliant Defense.”186  The 
self-reliant defense capability, mainly against North Korea but also beyond North Korea, 
was a long time national goal for South Korea since Park’s government in the 1970s.  For 
South Koreans, self-reliant defense is not just a matter of defending the country itself but 
is directly related to recovering full sovereignty of the state, replacing sixty years of an 
asymmetrical alliance relationship with the United States with a more symmetrical 
one.187  It also reflects the growing nationalism in South Korea.  Nevertheless, it is hard 
to deny that realistically the U.S. military presence is and will continue to be essential to 
the security of South Korea. 
Lastly, the inter-Korean relationship is a deeply complex matter.  For South 
Korea, North Korea is a clear and present military threat that must be deterred for its own 
survival.  Nonetheless, North Korea is also half of a future reunified Korea.  In case of a 
war, South Korea must fight and win, but also in case of North Korea’s collapse, South 
Korea must endure all the burdens coming from the North.  South Korea must consider 
the fact the North Korean regime is different from North Korean people.  Neither 
scenario is appealing to South Korea.  Ideally, the best scenario would be a gradual 
recovery of the North Korean economy at the same time as opening up its society by 
increasing interactions between the two Koreas, of course without radically changing the 
current Kim Jong-Il regime.188  It seems almost impossible to envision this scenario 
under the current situation on the peninsula: North Korea’s reckless behavior developing 
nuclear weapons in spite of strong warnings from its powerful neighbors including the  
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United States; discords between the U.S. and South Korean current governments’ policies 
toward North Korea; and the deepening the isolation of North Korea in the international 
community under U.N. resolutions.   
Taking these difficulties into account, and also considering the implications of 
U.S. strategic flexibility policy for the security of South Korea covered in the previous 
chapters, three policy options are nevertheless considered in this chapter.  Each option is 
designed to have a different level of acceptance of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy.  
South Korea’s three policy options are:  
1. Active support policy 
2. Constraint policy 
3. Status quo with strategic ambiguities. 
These three policy options will be tested from the four essential perspectives in South 
Korean security listed above.  However, first this chapter will begin by examining why 
these criteria are essential to South Korean policy and then demonstrate how each policy 
option works out within these criteria.   
A. FOUR ESSENTIAL PERSPECTIVES IN SOUTH KOREAN POLICY 
DECISION MAKING 
1. The U.S.-ROK Alliance 
The fundamental question to be answered prior to examining the policy options 
must be, is the U.S.-ROK alliance still necessarily beneficial to South Korean security?  
There is no question that it has been a pivotal element in South Korean security during 
the last half century, but are there any better options for South Korea instead of the 
current form of the U.S.-ROK alliance in the near to mid-term future?189  Above all, what 
are the alternatives to the strong U.S.-ROK alliance in South Korea?  Some conceivable 
alternatives available to South Korea in case of U.S. disengagement are: take sides with 
China, which is a continental power; depend on a multi-lateral security system rather than 
a bilateral alliance; become a middle power state, possibly with nuclear weapons; declare 
the ROK’s permanent neutral state within a nuclear free peninsula.   
Most importantly, within these alternatives, the primary question for South Korea 
is which alternative could best serve its security, considering the number of factors                                                  
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causing instabilities in the region, including the Korean peninsula itself.  In case of 
military conflict in the Korean peninsula, although South Korea might successfully 
defend itself from the North’s attack, the cost would be enormous without depending on 
its allies.  Moreover, realistically, South Korea does not have the capability to become 
another powerful actor in the region, such as China, Japan, Russia and the United States, 
nor has it the capability to sufficiently balance among these powerful actors in the region.  
Therefore, under the current Northeast Asian geopolitical power distribution structure 
and its operating system, there seems to be no realistic alternatives for South Korea other 
than a strong bilateral alliance system.  In terms of influence in the region and also 
sharing common values, such as democracy and free trade economy which has brought 
present prosperity to South Korea, it is necessary for South Korea to maximize the utility 
of its strong alliance relationship with the United States rather than seeking a new 
security partner.190  Multi-lateral security cooperation seems to be very idealistic for 
South Korea, which is surrounded by some of the most powerful states in the world.  
Indeed, it is unrealistic to depend solely on a multi-lateral security organization for its 
security, especially in a region such as Northeast Asia.191 Above all, mainly due to the 
rise of China and Japan’s aspiration to increase its influence in the region, multi-lateral 
security cooperation in the region seems unlikely in the near future.  South Korea’s desire 
to become a middle power, potentially with nuclear weapons, would also have critical 
negative implications for its security.  It will not only dismantle the alliance relationship 
with the United States but also bring serious instability into the region by nuclear 
proliferation.  This could cause even greater security risks to South Korea as long as the 
peninsula remains the most volatile and sensitive area into the region.  Moreover, the 
status of “middle power” has less importance in the context of the geo-political position 
of South Korea, as it is surrounded by the most powerful states in the world.  Lastly, 
declaring itself to be a neutral state under existing threat from North Korea without a 
sufficient deterrence capability could heavily undermine its security.  All the options  
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could have some benefits in one way or another to South Korea, but none of those 
options could fully satisfy the security needs of South Korea as much as the current U.S.-
ROK alliance does. 
Therefore, considering the security needs of South Korea, the U.S.-ROK alliance 
is one of the most important criteria in its policy options regarding strategic flexibility.  In 
this regards, South Korea’s policy options must at least not undermine the security 
alliance with the United States, if it could not strengthen the alliance.  Maintaining the 
security alliance relationship with the United States must be considered as a prerequisite 
as South Korea considers its policy options toward the U.S. strategic flexibility policy.   
2. Inter-Korean Relations 
During the last sixty years since the division of the two Koreas, the top priority in 
South Korean security policy has been always dominated by the question, “how could 
North Korea be successfully deterred from reinvading South Korea?”  Maintaining North 
Korean deterrence capability was the core of South Korean national security interest.  
Between the North and South military relationship, the most important factor is the 
deterrence capability rather than the defense capability.192  Considering the small size of 
the theater in the peninsula, successful defense cannot be regarded as a victory.  In the 
case of North Korea’s reinvasion, although the South would eventually defeat the North, 
it would not escape devastatingly massive destruction and damage from the war.  That 
means not only North Korea but also South Korea will be losers in the war if deterrence 
fails.   
In this context, for South Koreans, the U.S. strategic flexibility policy must not 
increase the security risk to South Korea by weakening its deterrence capability toward 
North Korea, and Seoul’s policy response must confirm this.  As previously discussed, 
although the USFK’s actual deterrence capabilities to North Korea would not be 
weakened by the initial realignment process, there are possibilities that its changing role 
to a regional purpose could give the wrong signal to North Korea.  Thus, South Korea’s 
policy options must firmly ensure that North Korea should not misperceive the U.S.-ROK 
alliance’s deterrence capabilities.   
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However, there is more than deterrence of North Korea that South Korean policy 
options should take into account within the inter-Korean relationship.  South Korean 
security policy toward North Korea in the long term must contemplate the reconciliation 
of the two Koreas.  In this context, the strategic flexibility of USFK contains several 
factors that could be interpreted as reducing military tensions in the peninsula as well as 
inducing reconciliation between the two Koreas.193   Troop reduction and relocating 
forces from the forward to the rear area could be understood as efforts to mitigate 
tensions by removing possible military confrontation assets stationed near the DMZ.  To 
some extent, the changing role of USFK from a fixed peninsula deterrence force to a 
flexible regional purpose could also be seen as a positive aspect to North Korea, as the 
primary purpose of USFK will be not focused on North Korea any longer.  In fact, North 
Korea claimed for a long time that the U.S. force presence in South Korea is the major 
reason for instability on the peninsula, insisting that only the full withdrawal of USFK 
could bring peace to the peninsula.   
In conclusion, South Korean policy options toward strategic flexibility must pay 
close attention to both deterrence and reconciliation elements in inter-Korean relations, 
and also should try to maintain a balance between them.  Indeed, this will be much easier 
said than done.  Managing North Korea’s deterrence perception would be a critical factor 
in this regard.  In many cases, the perception is as important as the actual capability in 
terms of deterrence. Through developing common interest in strategic flexibility with the 
United States as well as managing its public opinion, South Korea must firmly ensure 
that North Korea not misperceive its unchanged deterrence capability based on the robust 
U.S.-ROK military cooperation.  At the same time, South Korea must confirm to North 
Korea that the U.S.-ROK alliance has no intention of attacking North Korea, as well as 
effectively communicate that the purpose of strategic flexibility is not enhancing ROK 
offensive capability toward North Korea.194  In this regard, utilizing current high-level 
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military talks195 between the two Koreas could be a good start.  Overall, maintaining a 
strong deterrence capability does not mean increasing military tensions; on the contrary, 
it could contribute to peace in the peninsula by reducing the possibility of a war.  As long 
as North Korea remains a threat to South Korea, inter-Korean relations should be counted 
as a dominant factor to its security policy.    
3. Self-Reliant Defense 
A self-reliant defense is another critical factor in building South Korea’s policy 
options.  The notion of self-reliant defense is profoundly important to South Koreans.  
From the end of the 19th century until its independence in 1945, Korea was a prize to 
many powerful states exploiting the geopolitical advantage of the peninsula.  Moreover, 
the Korean War taught a clear lesson to South Koreans about how severe dangers from 
the absence of self-reliant defense capability were.  It was less than a year after the U.S. 
occupation troops had fully withdrawn from South Korea that North Korea invaded and 
took over most of South Korea in 1950.  Without the U.S. decision to participate in the 
Korean War, South Korea would not have survived as an independent state.  Since then, 
South Korea has relied heavily on the USFK to defend it and rendered the authority of 
command and control of ROK forces to the USFK commander.  Eventually, this strong 
dependence on the U.S. security umbrella led to a deep sense of self-reliant defense as 
South Korea’s economy has grown and defense capabilities have enhanced.   
It is clear that throughout South Korea’s history, the development of ROK forces 
was heavily influenced by the changes of the USFK.196  For example, the first effort to 
achieve self-reliant defense was initiated by President Park in the early 1970s, only to fill 
the gap created by the U.S. troop reduction under the Nixon Doctrine in 1969.  Based on 
the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) established in 1978, the ROK force 
has been deeply relying upon the USFK, especially in USFK’s counter-firing and 
intelligence gathering assets.   
                                                 
195 North and South Korean military representatives have been holding high level military talks - 
including the defense minister - since 2000. Recently, there was a working-level military meeting on 
October 2, 2006. It is noted that both parties had difficulties reaching an agreement on various military 
issues. “Two Koreas Meet for Snap Military Talks,” Chosunilbo, October 2, 2006.  
196 U.S. DOD, 2000 Report to Congress: Military Situation in the Korean Peninsula (Washington, 
DC: 2000), 3. “From the beginning ROK military is organized, equipped, and trained to defeat a DPRK 
attack as part of a combined ROK/US defense, not defend by itself.” 
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In this context, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) 
announced a Defense Reform Plan 2020 in September 2005.197   Mainly, under the 
auspices of achieving a self-reliant defense capability, it is designed to modernize ROK 
military equipment and achieve a higher level of professional military personnel.  In 
order to modernize equipment and construct an efficient joint force, the ROK military is 
trying to upgrade its forces with an advanced ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance) network and also a C4I (Command, Control, communications, 
Computing and Intelligence) infrastructure.  Moreover, amplifying the war fighting 
effectiveness with Effect Based Operations (EBOs) and Network Centric Warfare 
(NCW), has been set as the primary goal in the ROK’s defense transformation. 198 
Therefore, it is obvious that the ROK’s defense reform, especially in modernizing 
equipment, is modeled on the U.S. military transformation based on Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA).199  The United States’ support in transferring the technology, 
operation skills and actual military equipment will be crucial in this regard.  That means 
it will be difficult for South Korea to achieve a self-reliant defense capability without 
support from the United States. Besides, the USFK’s military transformation propelled 
South Korea to proactively embrace defense reform.  ROK forces will take over all ten 
major missions from USFK by 2006, and should take over the role of the U.S. 2nd 
Infantry Division in DMZ on its completion of relocation.  Recovering the wartime 
Operational Command and Control from CFC will become a turning point in the process 
of South Korea’s defense reform. Eventually, it is hard to deny that a significant 
component of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy will impel further self-reliance on ROK 
defense capabilities.   
In short, South Korean policy options must bear in mind that both U.S. strategic 
flexibility and South Korea’s Defense Reform are similarly based on the notion of 
“Koreanization of the South Korean defense.” As for South Korea, and also for the U.S.-
ROK alliance, it is crucial that there is a common interest between the two countries 
                                                 
197 ROK Ministry of Defense, Defense Reform 2020, the Way Ahead (Seoul, 2005). 
198 Chang-hee Nam, “The Realignment of the USFK in the Military Transformation and South 
Korea’s Defense Reform 2020,” NIDS International Symposium Report (2006): 46.  
199 U.S. Office of Force Transformation, The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 
(Washington, DC: 2004). 
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regarding the strategic flexibility of USFK.  The compatibility between South Korea’s 
Defense Reform Plan and the strategic flexibility of USFK will be the primary issue in 
this regard.  Consequently, South Korea’s policy option choices must reflect that its 
policy toward the strategic flexibility of USFK could substantially influence its efforts to 
achieve self-reliant defense, which is what would be proved in retrospect.   
4. Relationship with China and Japan 
Lastly, South Korea’s policy options must deliberately consider both China’s and 
Japan’s positions on the strategic flexibility of USFK.  As discussed in Chapter IV, China 
and Japan possess rather different perspectives on the U.S. strategic flexibility policy 
toward South Korea.  China worries that the U.S. strategic flexibility policy could 
increase U.S. influence in the region, especially on the Taiwan Strait issue.  On the 
contrary, Japan sees the overall U.S. military transformation in the region as an 
opportunity to enhance its own defense capability and also expand the role of its Self-
Defense Force throughout the region.   
In this context, if South Korea’s policy is seen to favor Japan, by actively 
supporting the U.S. strategic flexibility and integration with USFJ, it could negatively 
affect its relationship with China.  China could perceive that U.S.-Japan-South Korea 
military cooperation is aiming China, particularly in Taiwan Strait contingency. 
Conversely, if South Korea’s policy favors China by remaining reluctant about U.S. 
strategic flexibility and refusing further security cooperation with Japan, not only would 
South Korea’s relationship with Japan worsen, but it is possible that the status of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance could be degraded to the point that the United States might consider 
an end to its security relationship with South Korea.  In order to avoid either situation, 
South Korea’s policy options must consider de-emphasizing the USFK’s regional 
security role, which could stimulate China’s security concerns with regard to the Taiwan 
Strait.  Rather, encouraging USFK roles and missions beyond the region such as 
peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, as well as countering transnational threats 
globally, will be a better approach.  In this way South Korea could also maintain a 
cooperative relationship with Japan.  
The potential power competition and arms race between China and Japan are also 
significant factors in South Korea’s policy options.  As discussed in Chapter IV, the U.S. 
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strategic flexibility policy contains possibilities for a potential arms race in the region.  It 
is likely that South Korea will be the principle victim in case of a power struggle between 
China and Japan.200  This seems unlikely for now however, if a Cold War type bipolar 
system between China-Russia-North Korea and U.S.-Japan-South Korea develops in 
Northeast Asia, the Korean peninsula will certainly become the main arena of 
competition between the two groups.   
South Korea’s relationship with China and also with Japan has been crucial to its 
security policies.  Partial and imbalanced security policies favoring one side could bring 
about serious security risks to South Korea.  Thus, as long as China and Japan maintain 
their rivalry relationship and also as long as the U.S. strategic flexibility policy keeps its 
strategy to check China with Japan, South Korea’s policy options must try to balance 
relationships with China and Japan considering their positions on the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy.   
B. SOUTH KOREA’S POLICY OPTIONS 
The strategic flexibility of USFK was agreed upon between South Korea and the 
United States during the SCAP meeting in January 2006, yet the pact left many 
unresolved obscurities.  As discussed in Chapter II, even though it became a primary 
security issue between the two countries, there have been no further agreements 
regarding the details of strategic flexibility since then.  The ROK NSC immediately 
announced after the agreement that based on the SCAP Joint Statement “South Korea 
will not be entangled in the conflicts in Northeast Asia against the will of the South 
Korean people because of the U.S. strategic flexibility.”201 However, with the obscurity 
in the term “respect” in the Joint Statement,202 most South Koreans regard the agreement 
as South Korea’s recognizing the U.S. strategic flexibility rather than having a guarantee 
                                                 
200 Since Japan became a regional power after its modernization in the late 19th century, the Korean 
peninsula became a prize in power competition between China and Japan. Korea was under Japanese 
colonization during the first half of the 20th century, after Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese war in 
1894 and also Russia in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904. At the end of WWII, it was also divided into 
North and South Korea by other powerful states, the Soviet Union and the United States.  
201 ROK NSC, “Explanation on the U.S. Strategic Flexibility (Junlakjeok yuyeonseong sulmyung 
jaryo),” January 22, 2006. 
http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/archive/archive_view.php?meta_id=news_data&category=11&id=1c1e
837bfd15ad1c833c799 (Accessed November 13, 2006). 
202 U.S.-ROK SCAP Joint Statement, “the U.S. respects the ROK position that it shall not be involved 
in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.” 
93 
from the United States regarding South Korea’s involvement in the Taiwan Strait.  Thus, 
the South Korean government has been largely criticized by the public with regard to its 
diplomatic inability in the negotiations with the United States.  Mainly due to this 
domestic political pressure, but also due to its sensitive regional implications, South 
Korea has not developed a clear policy response to U.S. strategic flexibility.  
Given the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division, and the period of transferring 
wartime Operational Command and Control,203 it is likely that until the completion of 
both relocation and command transfer, the USFK will not be generally used for regional 
purposes.  Actual change in the role of USFK to a regional force is only expected after 
2008, when the 2nd Infantry Division fully relocates to the Osan Pyungtaek area which is 
the phase II of the relocation.  
Therefore, there is still some breathing room for South Korea to control the 
implications of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy.  Different approaches to U.S. strategic 
flexibility will cause somewhat different results not only to the security of South Korea 
but also to the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance.  Three policy options are suggested based 
on South Korea’s level of acceptance of the strategic flexibility of USFK and they are 
assessed based on the four essential perspectives discussed above.  
1. Active Support Policy 
This policy basically suggests that not only does South Korea agree with the 
regional role of USFK, it will also actively support USFK’s coming in and out of the 
peninsula without special regulations or limitation.  Under the principle of “not risking 
the security of South Korea,” USFK could be permitted to act rather freely with regards 
to its redeployments.  South Korea would support the bases and logistics for the USFK 
performing regional roles.  Eventually, ROK forces will take a primary role in the 
defense of South Korea, and the USFK will take a primary role in regional stability.  Both 
forces will support each others’ role as a secondary mission. 
                                                 
203 Phase I of relocating the 2nd Infantry Division, which is to consolidate the dispersed bases near 
DMZ to Camp Casey and Red Cloud, is to be completed by the end of 2008. Phase II, which is to move all 
the forces further south to the Osan-Pyungtaek area, will be decided between two countries at an 
appropriate time. The wartime Operational Command and Control is to be transferred to ROK forces from 
2009-2012. 
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Several different implications of this policy will be considered based on the four 
criteria: effect of the alliance, on South Korea’s self-reliant defense, on the peninsula, and 
on the region.   
The U.S.-ROK Alliance: Active support of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy 
implies that South Korea will be part of the future U.S. coalition of the willing in the Asia 
Pacific area.  The U.S. military transformation will be accelerated and the alliance will be 
strengthened.  Possibly, the alliance would be developed into a regional alliance as the 
USFK, supported by ROK forces, perform a regional role.  It will be more likely to 
follow the path of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  In this case, the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense 
Treaty might be revised or replaced by new “Security Cooperation Guidelines.”204  
Inter-Korean Relations: Based on the analysis in Chapter IV, actual deterrence 
capabilities toward North Korea would not be weakened even though the USFK 
abandons the role of “tripwire.” As long as North Korea perceives strategic flexibility as 
increasing the U.S. preemptive strike capability, South Korea’s active support of strategic 
flexibility could further worsen the inter-Korean relationship.  However, regardless of 
strategic flexibility, as long as North Korea perceives the U.S.-ROK military cooperation 
as offensive, even minor U.S.-ROK security cooperation such as combined exercises or 
merely movement of forces in and out of the peninsula would be seen as an increasing 
threat to North Korea.  
Self-Reliant Defense:  Supporting U.S. strategic flexibility does not mean 
deepening the asymmetrical alliance relationship with the United States and abandoning 
self-reliant defense.  It would more likely facilitate the process of South Korea’s self-
reliant defense capability.205  As South Korea supports the regional role of the USFK, the 
United States will reciprocally support South Korea’s building a self-reliant defense 
capability.  The United States’ support is critical to South Korea, especially to modernize 
its military equipment and upgrade its overall force structure under the Defense Reform 
2020.  Hopefully, with close cooperation between the United States and South Korea, by  
 
                                                 
204 Moon, 190.  
205 Sang-Jo Jeon, “Transforming the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” USAWC Strategy Research Project (2006): 
15. 
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the time ROK forces take over the wartime Operational Command and Control from 
USFK, which will be from 2009-2012, the first stage of the Defense Reform 2020 will 
also be fully implemented.   
Relationships with China and Japan: South Korea’s relationship with China will 
be the most troublesome factor within this policy.  China will be uncomfortable with the 
USFK’s regional missions together with the USFJ, together acting as a regional stabilizer.  
As previously discussed, China could view that the U.S.-Japan-South Korea’s military 
cooperation is targeting China in case of a contingency in the Taiwan Strait.  South 
Korea’s relationship with Japan will become closer, as they both actively support and 
participate in the U.S. military transformation process.  In this case, the possibility of a 
trilateral alliance among the U.S.-Japan-ROK is high.206  However, at the same time a 
potential arms race, mainly between China and Japan seeking regional hegemony, will 
increase resulting in a Cold War type bipolar system.   
2. Constraint Policy 
Due to the strong domestic political pressure stemming from the fear about future 
“entrapment” in the Taiwan Strait, and in order to limit USFK’s role mainly to deter 
North Korea, the South Korean government could develop its efforts to limit and restrict 
the implementation of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy.  First of all, South Korea 
would try to establish a “prior consultation” system regarding the flow in and out of the 
USFK in order to constrain its movement.  Through this system, South Korea could veto 
USFK’s deployment to the regional conflict area by arguing that it could risk South 
Korean security, based on the principle that “strategic flexibility must not risk South 
Korean security by involving it in unwanted regional conflicts.” Most of the regional 
contingencies are considered risking the security of South Korea, in order to further 
constrain the flow out of the USFK.  Within this policy, it is considered that even though 
the realignment of the USFK is completed, South Korea will attempt to maintain the 
USFK’s North Korean deterrence role by limiting its redeployment from the peninsula.    
The U.S.-ROK Alliance: As South Korea attempts to maximize limitations on the 
U.S. strategic flexibility policy and tries to maintain the USFK’s role as solely deterring 
                                                 
206 Regarding the trilateral security cooperation under U.S. military transformation, see, Chang-Hee 
Nam and others., 144-146. “Trilateral Security Cooperation in the Post-9/11 Context.”  
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North Korea, the U.S. and ROK relationship will likely become worse.  If South Korea 
strongly insists that the USFK remain as a force fixed on the peninsula instead of a 
regional force, the United States could view the U.S.-ROK alliance as an obstruction to 
its efficient utilization of its own military forces.  Eventually the U.S.-ROK alliance 
could be seriously weakened, or in the worst case it could be dismantled.   
Inter-Korean Relations: In the short term, deterrence to North Korea could be 
maintained with USFK remaining primarily a deterrence force.  Nevertheless, as the 
U.S.-ROK alliance weakens or the USFK withdraws early due to confrontation over the 
strategic flexibility issue, it will be difficult to expect North Korean deterrence from 
USFK.  Most likely, the weakened alliance with the United States could bring about a 
serious decrease not only in deterrence capability to North Korea but also to South 
Korea’s overall defense capability.  Besides, this could give the wrong signal to North 
Korea, as it did in 1950 after the announcement of Acheson Line, by initiating a massive 
military attack on the South.  Some people in the radical left argue that the full 
withdrawal of USFK and subsequent breakup of the U.S.-ROK alliance could bring 
reconciliation and peace in the peninsula.207 However, as long as North Korea continues 
to maintain its “military first policy,” inter-Korean reconciliation without a strong 
deterrence capability is an extremely risky a venture for South Korea.   
Self-Reliant Defense: If South Korea attempts to constrain the strategic flexibility 
of USFK and the United States consequently decides to further reduce or fully withdraw 
its forces from Korea, this could—superficially—be seen as an accomplishment of self-
reliant defense as South Korea would have finally gotten rid of its asymmetrical patron 
and client relationship with the United States.  However, it is hard to conclude that South 
Korea actually possesses sufficient self-reliant defense capability, even though it seems 
that South Korea is defending itself with its own forces.  Self-reliant defense does mean 
that South Korea could defend itself without the need of others’ help.  Nonetheless, it 
does not mean that South Korea should break up an already well-established alliance only 
to persist in defending itself with its own force, especially when its own defense 
                                                 
207 A number of peace and reunification related civil groups such as Peace Network, Pyungtongsa, 
Peace and Reunification Research, in South Korea argue the withdrawal of the USFK is the first step to 
reunify two Koreas.  
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capability is not enough to deter the current threat.208  Furthermore, in the longer term, 
modernization of South Korea’s military under the current Defense Reform Plan relies 
heavily on United States support, and in many ways it is designed to go along with the 
U.S. forces realignment in Korea.  Hence, as South Korea tries to maximize limitations 
on the U.S. strategic flexibility policy, establishing self-reliant defense based on the 
Defense Reform 2020 would also be constrained as it would be difficult to expect active 
support from the United States.  Constraining U.S. strategic flexibility will not contribute 
to South Korea’s self-reliant defense.  
Relationships with China and Japan: In the short to mid-term China could view 
South Korea’s independent behavior from the United States as an opportunity to further 
expand its influence on the peninsula.  South Korea could seek more security cooperation 
with China in terms of dissuading North Korea.  Thus, the close cooperative relationship 
in economy and also in North Korean policy will likely be the common interests of both 
countries.  However, in the long term, if the weakened U.S.-ROK alliance leads to 
constant instability on the peninsula due to North Korea’s provocative behavior, China 
would not prefer the consequences.  It would be better for China to maintain close 
economic and political relationships with both Koreas and stability in the peninsula under 
the U.S.-ROK alliance, rather than constant instabilities or in the worst case a war in the 
peninsula without the U.S.-ROK alliance.  Apparently, Japan will not prefer South 
Korea’s being independent from the United States by limiting and refusing strategic 
flexibility.  South Korea’s policy could severely affect Japan’s security relationship with 
the United States.  As South Korea’s relationship with the United States withered, Japan 
could fear the situation of “singularization” that it could be the only U.S. ally remaining  
 
 
                                                 
208 Du-Hyun Cha, “The Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Toward the Evolution of a Strategic 
Cooperation Alliance,” The KIDA Papers, no. 7 (2004): 11. 
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in Northeast Asia.209  Moreover, as the U.S.-ROK alliance loses its vitality, by losing the 
United States as broker, the relationship between South Korea and Japan could rapidly 
deteriorate.  
3. Status Quo with Strategic Ambiguities  
The South Korean government officially announced last January that some 
ambiguities are purposely left within the agreement of the U.S. strategic flexibility.210  It 
is explained by the South Korean NSC that considering the current security environment 
of the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia, it is impossible to establish detailed 
procedures for all possible scenarios regarding this issue.  Moreover, with uncertainties in 
the future, agreement on the principles without the details could render a more flexible 
and pertinent response to any situation.  Therefore, as long as both countries understand 
and respect each others’ priorities within the strategic flexibility policy of USFK, 
whenever a situation happens both will closely cooperate to seek a solution.  Under this 
approach, South Korea’s policy would contain some deliberate ambiguities about U.S. 
strategic flexibility.  With neither active support nor maximized constraints on strategic 
flexibility, this policy will seek to maintain the status quo and take chances as situation 
surrounding this issue develops.  
The U.S.-ROK alliance: With this South Korean status quo policy the U.S.-ROK 
alliance will neither be strengthened nor weakened dramatically but will simply be 
maintained.  To some extent, it may be better to leave the issue with some ambiguities 
than to painfully negotiate the details which might lead to more rift in the alliance.211  
However, as the U.S. realignment process in Korea concludes, this status quo policy with  
 
 
                                                 
209 “The decay of the U.S.-South Korea alliance is also possible. As the United States and South 
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strategic ambiguities will become more problematic.  It could bring about unexpected 
consequences which could cause fatal harm to the U.S.-ROK alliance in case of a sudden 
military conflict in the region.   
Inter-Korean relations: There will be not much change in deterrence capability 
toward North Korea.  Whether South Korea actively supports the strategic flexibility or 
just maintains the status quo, with the agreement between two countries hitherto, the 
USFK will be transformed to a regional force in any case.  As discussed before, 
transformation will cause minor changes in actual deterrence capability toward North 
Korea.  This status quo policy will not directly contribute to reconciliation with North 
Korea, yet it will have fewer negative effects on inter-Korean relations than the active 
support policy.  Having ambiguities, South Korea could have more breathing room to 
deal with North Korea in terms of how the strategic flexibility of USFK will work in the 
peninsula.   
Self-reliant defense: Maintaining a status quo policy toward U.S. strategic 
flexibility seems to have less impact on South Korea’s search for self-reliant defense.  
Nevertheless, as previously discussed, South Korea’s achieving self-reliant defense is 
closely related with the USFK’s transformation process.  For South Korea, support from 
the United States is necessary to successfully implement the Defense Reform Plan, 
particularly in terms of modernizing equipment and force structure.  In this respect, it will 
be difficult for South Korea to expect full support from the United States as long as it 
remains ambiguous about the U.S. strategic flexibility policy.  Therefore, this policy 
would contribute less to South Korea’s achieving self-reliant defense capability with the 
United States’ cooperation than the active support policy.   
Relationships with China and Japan: In terms of not stimulating China’s security 
concerns as much as the first policy option and also not increasing Japan’s concerns 
about “singularization,” in the short term this status quo policy could contribute to South 
Korea’s security interests.  This policy could remain effective if South Korea is able to 
develop a strong internal alliance relationship with the United States based on mutual 
trust and confidence.  Otherwise, in the long term it will be difficult for South Korea to 
maintain this status quo policy.  Due to current discord on the strategic flexibility issue, 
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by the time that the USFK’s realignment is completed, and when USFK, along side the 
USFJ, begins to intervene in regional conflicts, this will definitely cause tensions with 
China.  Therefore, while, in the short run, this policy might help in maintaining South 
Korea’s relationships with both China and Japan without provoking either one, in the 
long run it will cause the same issues with China as the active support policy option. 
South Korea’s three policy options for responding to U.S. strategic flexibility are 
summarized through the following tables.  Table 1 summarizes the implications of the 
three policy options.  According to the four essential perspectives, each policy option will 
have either more positive or more negative implications for South Korean security.  
Based on these implications, Table 2 shows South Korea’s policy preference for each 
criterion.  Each criterion shows different policy preferences depending on the 
implications for South Korean security.   
 
 Active Support Constraint Status Quo 
U.S.-ROK Alliance 
- strengthen alliance
- possibly develop to 
regional alliance 
- weaken alliance 
- in worst case could  
cause collapse of 
alliance 
- in short term, could 
maintain alliance 
- but in long term, 






- possibly worsen 
the relationship 
- in short term, 
maintain deterrence, 
- but in long term, 
could seriously 
weaken deterrence 
- no contribution in 
reconciliation 
- maintain deterrence 
capability 




- contribute to self-
reliant defense 
- negative impact to 
self-reliant defense  
- less contribution to 
self-reliant defense 
than active support 
policy  
Relationship with 
China and Japan 
- China: worsen 
- Japan: improve 
- possibly cause 
arms race in the 
region 
- China: in short to 
mid-term improve, 
but in long term 
uncertain 
- Japan: worsen 
- China/Japan: in 
short term could 
maintain current 
relations, in long 
term similar results 
to active support 
policy 




 South Korea’s Preferred Policy 
U.S.-ROK Alliance Active Support  >  Status Quo  >  Constraint 
Inter-Korean Relations Status Quo  >  Active Support  >  Constraint 
Self-Reliant Defense Active Support  >  Status Quo  >  Constraint 
Relationship with China and 
Japan Status Quo  >  Constraint  >  Active Support 
Table 2.   South Korea’s Policy Preferences  
 
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Based on the evaluation of the four essential elements for each policy option, each 
of the three options have benefits but also shortcomings.  By choosing a policy option, 
benefits must be maximized while shortcomings should be able to be compromised.  
Active support policy will be the best option to strengthen the alliance and at the same 
time to foster South Korea’s self-reliant defense.  However, it is better to pursue a status 
quo policy than an active support policy regarding inter-Korean relations and also the 
relationships with China and Japan.  Maximizing the limitations to the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy could improve the relationship with China, but other than that, it has a 
negative impact on the rest of the criteria.  
Therefore, the policy recommendation for South Korea regarding the U.S. 
strategic flexibility is to pursue both a status quo and an active support policy. That is to 
say, in the short term, try to maintain the status quo policy but in the mid to long term 
seek an active support policy.  South Korea should, more externally than internally, 
maintain the current strategic ambiguities toward the U.S. strategic flexibility policy and 
try not to deteriorate inter-Korean relations, and avoid stimulating the security concerns 
of China.  This will give more breathing space and put South Korea in an advantageous 
position to engage both North Korea and China with more flexible and favorable 
interpretations of strategic flexibility.   
In this regard, South Korea should emphasize that reducing and removing the 
U.S. forces near the DMZ was exactly what North Koreans have been requesting for a 
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long time in terms of reducing tensions in the DMZ area.212  Besides, South Korea could 
stress that breaking away from a threat-based U.S.-ROK alliance could give a better 
chance for the two Koreas to engage actively in reconciliation.  To China, South Korea 
must assure that it does not have interests in interfering in the Taiwan Strait issue by 
recognizing this issue strongly as China’s own sovereignty issue.213  Also, South Korea 
must support resolutions for peaceful diplomacy in case of disputes between China and 
Taiwan.  Above all, it must emphasize that the existence of the U.S.-ROK alliance is not 
designed to threaten China but rather will continuously contribute to a peaceful and stable 
region.214   
The best way for this approach to succeed is to encourage the strategic flexibility 
policy to be more focused on transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, natural 
disasters, and pandemic disease, rather than emphasizing the less feasible regional 
conflicts such as a potential Taiwan Strait conflict between the U.S. and China.  
Removing attention from regional contingencies to common global security issues will 
greatly reduce the negative aspects of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy toward South 
Korea.215  South Korea could learn from Japan’s case.  It is known that as a part of the 
realignment, Japan is planning to establish a new headquarters of a Ground SDF Central 
Readiness Force Command in Zama by 2012, where the U.S. First Army Corp in 
Washington is scheduled to move.  It is known that the Ground SDF Central Readiness 
Force will operate units for nation-wide mobile operations and special tasks in order to 
fight terrorism, guerrilla actions, and other emergencies.  Similarly, South Korea could 
create “peace and stability forces”216 which could perform international peace keeping 
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activities and various crisis response activities together with USFK.  Countering terrorism 
and managing low-intensity conflicts in and out of the peninsula will also be one of the 
main roles of this force.  Furthermore, focusing on transnational threats also greatly 
conforms to the U.S. national security strategy which was reflected in the SCAP Joint 
Statement.217  
In the mid to long term and more internally than externally, South Korea should 
support the U.S. strategic flexibility policy in order to strengthen the alliance as well as to 
accelerate its own self-reliant defense.  For South Korea, it is better to focus on the 
positive aspects of strategic flexibility than the negative since the agreement on strategic 
flexibility is already made and the transformation of USFK is already underway.  South 
Korean leaders should stop trumpeting the differences between the United States and 
South Korea on this issue and should emphasize how it could serve their security interests.  
Moreover, considering the fact that there are no possible realistic alternatives to the U.S.-
ROK alliance on its security, this attitude is much more beneficial to South Korea.  
Therefore, South Korea should take this opportunity to achieve a strong alliance with 
United States and self-reliant defense capability by actively supporting the U.S. military 
transformation together with implementing its Defense Reform Plan.   
South Korean’s reconsideration of strategic flexibility is necessary in this regards.  
The strategic flexibility plans and the realignment of the USFK must be considered as 
necessary not only for U.S. military transformation, but also for South Korea’s self-
reliant defense.  Again both concepts simultaneously share the notion of the 
“Koreanization of South Korean defense.”  In addition, South Koreans must not forget 
that the relocation of the Yongsan garrison and closing down other U.S. bases in Korea 
was initiated at the request of South Korea in order to reduce burdens for local 
communities.   
In conclusion, it is necessary for South Korea to maximize the strong points of 
both the recommended policies:  however, it is equally important for South Korea not to 
neglect its efforts on minimizing the shortcomings.  While pursuing an active support 
policy in the long term, it must be careful not to provoke North Korea and worsen the 
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inter-Korean relationship.  Also, it must take into account the security concerns of China 
regarding strategic flexibility by focusing on common global issue rather than regional 
security issues, and must pursue balanced approaches to China and Japan in order not to 
trigger an arms race in the region.  At the same time, South Korea must recognize the 
possibility that a continuous status quo policy could bring about a crisis in the alliance by 
being unable to manage adequately the rapidly changing security environments 
surrounding the peninsula.  Also, South Korea must carefully manage the strategic 
ambiguities in its short term status quo policy to avoid being misunderstood by the U.S. 
side as attempting to limit strategic flexibility, which could subsequently cause 
constraints on South Korea’s seeking self-reliant defense.  The only way to avoid these 
negative results from a status quo policy is to strengthen the alliance relationship with the 
United States internally.  South Korea must maintain a close consultative and cooperative 
security relationship with the United States based on current frameworks such as the 
Security Policy Initiative (SPI) 218  and SCAP.  Moreover, South Korea must make 
continuous efforts to enhance confidence and trust within the alliance: thus it could 
persuade the United States to more readily acknowledge South Korea’s security 
difficulties regarding strategic flexibility.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The current U.S.-ROK alliance is dominated by the North Korean nuclear 
weapons development issue.  The United States and South Korea’s perception gap is 
inevitable considering the nature of the North Korean nuclear issue in the current security 
environment.  With the current policies of the both governments, it will be difficult to 
overcome the contemporary problems in the alliance as long as the U.S.-ROK alliance is 
perceived through the lens of the North Korean nuclear issue. 219  Conversely, both 
countries must strive to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue by strengthening the U.S.-
ROK alliance.  They must bear in mind that the foundation of the U.S.-ROK alliance was 
from their common perception and cooperation against North Korean aggression.  
Therefore, within current status of the weakened alliance, it is hard to expect the 
resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through their mutually opposing North 
Korean policies.  The United States must recognize that its hard-line policy toward North 
Korea is not only causing difficulties in the relationship between the United States and 
South Korea, but also increasing China’s and Russia’s influence in the region at the 
expense of its own influence.220  Also, South Korea must admit that there are limitations 
with its embracing North Korea’s “Sunshine policy” and disregarding cooperation with 
the Unites States.  In this context, the crucial factor in strengthening the U.S.-ROK 
alliance is how both countries could overcome the perception gap generating from the 
alliance transformation process under the U.S. strategic flexibility policy.    
Whether South Korea likes it or not, it is hard to deny that the strategic flexibility 
of USFK transforming its security relationship with the United States.  Taking into 
account that strategic flexibility is based on the U.S. international security strategy and 
military transformation, changes in the USFK’s status are inevitable regardless of South 
Korea’s opposition.  Moreover, it is unrealistic to simply oppose and try to disregard the 
U.S. strategic flexibility policy, which some Korean scholars and many civil groups insist 
upon doing because that policy is already agreed upon between the two countries and the 
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USFK’s realignment is already underway.  One of the fundamental problems in South 
Korean’s perception of the U.S. strategic flexibility policy is that Koreans perceive this 
issue with too much of a political mind rather than a strategic mind.  As it is discussed in 
Chapter II, the United States is approaching the strategic flexibility policy within its 
international security strategy: therefore, South Koreans must escape from the 
perspective that the transformation of USFK is stemming from the United States’ 
political retaliation against South Korea’s recent anti-American sentiments and their 
different policies toward North Korea.221   
In this context, it is important to reiterate the two most debated issues about the 
U.S. strategic flexibility policy examined in Chapter IV.  First, regarding the issue of 
strategic flexibility weakening North Korean deterrence, South Korea must acknowledge 
that the transformation of USFK is not designed to weaken the current USFK deterrence 
capabilities toward the North Korean threat. Instead, the actual U.S. firepower capability 
seems to be unchanged, and based on the transformation, more agile ground forces and 
advanced naval and air assets could bring more efficient deterrence capability.  
Moreover, South Korea must understand that there are rather positive elements in the 
transformation such as: the U.S. strategic flexibility policy will facilitate the 
“Koreanization of the South Korean defense,” thus boosting South Korea’s efforts to 
secure future self-reliant North Korean deterrence capability. Therefore, because of its 
excessive concerns about the USFK’s deterrence capabilities, South Korea must not make 
mistakes by either sending a wrong signal to North Korea about deterrence or stimulating 
the United States to withdraw its troops which could cause actual reduction in deterrence 
capability. 
Second, regarding the issue of “entrapment,” specifically South Korea’s 
unintended involvement in a Taiwan Strait conflict, South Korea must change its 
perception that it is not stemming from the USFK’s strategic flexibility but it is instead 
generating from South Korea’s fundamental alliance relationship with the United States.  
South Korea must contemplate that the security risks from the “entrapment” scenario is 
the inevitable cost of maintaining an alliance relationship with the United States.  One 
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must consider it as the price for the benefits of the alliance.222  Certainly there are some 
security risks in strengthening the alliance relationship with the United States: however, 
South Korea must recognize that there are even further security risks if the alliance is 
seriously weakened or dismantled.223  
In addition, the South Korean government must never neglect strategic 
flexibility’s ripple effect, namely how the changing role of USFK to a more regional 
function and changing the U.S.-ROK alliance to regional security alliance could bring 
about shifts in the region.  South Korea must make an effort to not deteriorate its current 
close economic cooperation with China: it can do this by remaining strategically 
ambiguous on U.S. strategic flexibility based on the status quo policy. Also, South Korea 
must acknowledge the importance of its relationship with Japan, as long as the United 
States underscores the U.S.-Japan alliance.  Thus, current dynamics among the three 
countries should not be changed by degrading the U.S.-ROK alliance or subordinating it 
to the U.S.-Japan alliance.  In this regard, one of the long term measures for South Korea 
to pursue in the region is developing the current six-party talks system into a regional 
multilateral security organization along with other current regional security dialogues, 
such as Asian Regional Forum (ARF), Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), 
and Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).  Based on participants’ 
cooperation and efforts to reach peaceful resolution on the North Korean nuclear issue 
could be developed to further enhance regional security cooperation on other issues.  
Ideally, it could complement South Korea’s current security assurance from the U.S.-
ROK alliance and furthermore, in the long term, this regional security cooperation 
organization could serve as a primary security guarantee in the Korean peninsula.   
However, until this regional security cooperation framework develops in the 
region, maintaining a strong U.S.-ROK alliance is in the key national interests of South 
Korea.  Therefore, as part of transforming the U.S.-ROK alliance, South Korea must refer 
to the U.S.-Japan alliance case rather than the U.S.-Philippines case.  The Philippines 
appears to be the most prominent failure case in transitioning alliances at the end of the 
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Cold War.  In contrast to Japan, the Philippines government undermined the strategic 
necessity of its relationship with the United States in the new security environment and 
by indolently dealing with its domestic anti-American sentiment, and it eventually failed 
to maintain the alliance relationship with the United States.224 
South Korea must learn lessons from Japan’s reaction to the U.S.-Japan alliance 
transformation.  Although there are many different characteristics within the two 
alliances under different security priorities, they share the most important common 
principle which is that their alliance relationship with the United States is critical to their 
overall security.  Therefore, Japan’s reactions toward strategic transformation contain 
greater implications for South Korea.  First and foremost, South Korea needs to develop a 
defense policy such as Japan’s National Defense Policy Guidelines (NDPG) in 2004, 
which could clearly correspond to the U.S. Global Posture Review (GPR) process.  Then 
with close cooperation and coordination, South Korea must make an effort to integrate 
this policy into the U.S. military transformation and induce a consensus within the 
alliance on this policy.  Both sides’ common security interests must be maximized within 
this process.  In this context, as discussed previously in Chapter III, it is important to note 
that the new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines in 1997 were crucial to enhance the U.S.-
Japan security relationship, and eventually contributed to set the basis of alliance 
transformation.  Although there are annual Security Consultative Meetings (SCM) and 
Military Consultative Meetings (MCM) between the U.S. and ROK, there is no “Defense 
Guidelines” between the two countries that could articulate security policies and defense 
cooperation in the alliance.  Since the security environment is constantly changing, it is 
necessary to establish “Security Cooperation Guidelines” that reflect the principles of the 
security cooperation in the alliance, similar to the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines. 
Overall, in this context South Korea’s policy response toward the U.S. strategic 
flexibility policy will be vital to its security and also to the U.S.-ROK alliance.  South 
Korea’s policy should take into account the four essential elements discussed in Chapter 
V: the U.S.-ROK alliance; inter-Korean relations; self-reliant defense; and the 
relationship with China and Japan.  The recommended policy, a combination of active 
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support and the status quo, must focus in the short term on how the strategic flexibility 
policy should not negatively influence inter-Korean relations and the China and Japan 
relationships.  On the other hand, in the mid to long term, the policy must concentrate on 
strengthening the alliance relationship with the United States and also a developing a 
self-reliant defense capability.   
Therefore, the one of the best ways to successfully implement this policy is to link 
the U.S. strategic flexibility policy to South Korea’s self-reliant national defense policy 
which is based on the Defense Reform 2020.  In many aspects, increasing the strategic 
flexibility of USFK is parallel to South Korea’s efforts focusing on accomplishing self-
reliant national defense.  Under the objective of the “Koreanization of South Korean 
defense,” they both pursue similar paths within the alliance transformation.  Furthermore, 
focusing on South Korea’s self-reliant defense has many more benefits than emphasizing 
U.S. strategic flexibility.  In terms of South Korea’s changing asymmetrical alliance 
relationship with the United States under the self-reliant defense policy, it could give 
more positive implications to inter-Korean relations as well as the Sino-ROK 
relationship.  Accordingly, the United States should actively cooperate and coordinate 
with South Korea on its Defense Reform 2020 not only as an issue for South Korea’s 
own security but also as a significant issue facing the alliance’s transformation.  In 
conclusion, the United States and South Korea must actively search for and develop the 
common elements in the U.S. strategic flexibility policy and South Korea’s Defense 
Reform 2020.  This issue must be dealt with on the two countries’ security policy 
cooperation level, possibly during the next Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) or at 
least in the Military Consultative Meeting (MCM).  Also, it must be regarded as the core 
issue and continuously discussed through the U.S.-ROK Strategic Cooperation in Allied 
Partnership (SCAP) meetings.  Finally, there must be more research and analysis on the 
relationship between the U.S. strategic flexibility and South Korea’s Defense Reform 
2020, which will have significant implications in South Korea’s security and also in the 
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